Answering Leighton Flowers on Libertarian Freedom and Compatibilism

In his podcasts, stalwart anti-Calvinist Leighton Flowers is fond of defining "Libertarian Free Will" (LFW) as "the ability to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

In at least one of his blog posts, he has defined the term a little further, as follows:

LFW = "The categorical ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action." 

(See here: https://soteriology101.wordpress.com/2017/07/01/sinaholics-a-debate-over-inability/)

First, let's define the added term, "categorical." According to the Oxford Dictionary, this word means "unambiguously explicit and direct." (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/categorical)

So, updating Dr. Flowers' working definition with this meaning, we have:

LFW = "The unambiguously explicit and direct ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

No real significance is added with the inclusion of "categorical;" it simply renders the statement slightly more emphatic. As far as the addition of "the will" to this working definition, this also does not seem to add anything of substance. By definition, choosing and deciding are activities in which the will is active. Whether we phrase this as "refrain or not refrain from," or, as I would prefer, "engage or not engage in," a given moral action--this is nothing more than a description of the will's basic function. A person without a will could do nothing of a moral nature.

This definition of LFW summarizes the position Dr. Flowers affirms in opposition to what he thinks Calvinists believe. Nevertheless, I wonder how many well-informed Calvinists would actually dispute the fact that this ability exists?

As a Calvinist and theological compatibilist, I really have no problem accepting Dr. Flowers' definition as a valid description of "will" (or even "free will") and affirming that human beings possess it. Every rational person should find this to be intuitive and self-evident. Of course human beings have this ability. At the same time, my compatibilism affirms that all of the "free choices" of human beings are foreknown and foreordained by a wise and good God. One might ask, "How can this be?" 

From the perspective of compatibilism, we can line up the propositions this way:

P1 Human beings possess the ability to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P2 God has ordained which moral actions each human being will choose to refrain from, and which moral actions each human being will choose not to refrain from.

P3 Human beings exercise their "free will" in choosing to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P4 God exercises His sovereignty in determining how, when, where, and why man's "free will" shall be exercised. 

These are the rudimentary claims of theological compatibilism, which in itself is a very simple concept. From this standpoint, I would affirm Dr. Flowers' definition of LFW within my own understanding of compatibilism, and would find no contradiction. In what it affirms, his claim is true and just needs more added to it. His definition adequately describes man's part; however, God's part is neglected.

Of course, much more rigorous philosophical definitions of LFW have been put forth, and they typically entail a denial of the possibility that specified moral actions are pre-determined in any way. We should oppose that type of LFW as an outright denial of Biblical truth. At least at the level of defining terms, Leighton Flowers does not seem to hold to that type of LFW. And that is commendable, for it leaves the door open to a Biblical compatibilism.

On the other hand, if Dr. Flowers were to put forth a definition like the following, we would have to reject it:

LFW = "the willingness of the will to choose what is good (as God defines it), apart from grace."

What is the difference? If we are only talking about "ability," that is one thing. God gives all of us abilities that we do not exercise. I always have the "ability" to steal food from the grocery store; however, by the grace of God I have so far never had the "will" to do it. I also have the "ability" to purchase and smoke cigarettes. And, fortunately, I have never had the "will" to do that, either. I also have the ability to purchase food and give it to homeless people. By God's grace that has actually happened once or twice. The operative phrase here is "by God's grace."

Sadly, there are also morally reprehensible actions I have had the will to do from time to time, and I did not refrain from doing them. And it is just the same with you, my friend. We are all sinners who have had our wills set in opposition to God and have done a variety of evil things. I thank God that by His mercy I have not done even more evil. If not for His mercy, I surely would have. That I recognize my evils as evil, and that He gives me the willingness to repent and pursue the good, is an incredible mercy. But this is not from any purportedly natural "free will," it is from grace alone!

As a compatibilist, I affirm that my every inclination toward good is graciously given from God. Such willingness would not have sprung up out of my own heart, if grace had not been given to direct me toward the good and the right. If not for grace, I certainly would have refrained from every good act and would have only pursued evil.

As a compatibilist, I affirm that every inclination I have toward evil comes solely from me. I own it and I am fully responsible for it, even if God also foreordained which actions I will choose. His foreordination does not change the fact that it is my own will and I am responsible. I was the one who chose to refrain or not refrain. It wasn't as if I tried to do good and He instead directed me toward evil, saying "I would rather you do this evil thing." And it is not as though He made me do it, in any sense. Foreordination is not that. God forbid that such an unworthy thought should ever be embraced.

Ever since the fall, man's will and very nature have been bent toward evil, and this can only change through God's grace. By nature, apart from grace, fallen man, having the ability to choose between good and evil, will always choose evil. The problem is not rooted in "ability;" it is rooted in "will." Fallen man is "totally unable" to do good only because he is "totally unwilling." Thankfully, common grace results in a measure of good that is accomplished even through the unregenerate. Saving grace results in the introduction of a new, regenerated nature within the believer. A nature that truly longs for what is good. And so, by God's grace, there is much good in the world. We should glorify Him perpetually and magnificently for this!

A Biblical perspective would never credit the choice for good to our own mere ability or willingness (this would be self-deception and vainglory); nor would it ever blame God for our own choices of evil (that would be blasphemous and ignorant).

Biblical thinking can only give God all the glory for all of the good that occurs. And we can only accept full responsibility for our own choices and actions. With this perspective, the believer is driven to keep repenting of his own evil and to continually ask God for more grace so that he can grow and do more good to the glory of God.

As Paul states:

I Cor. 15:10  But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God that is with me.

With Dr. Flowers' perspective, one wonders how the believer may ever know that he is experiencing grace, since it all seems to boil down to the exercise of one's own natural ability to "refrain or not refrain" from this or that moral action. When does a person come face to face with the realities of his own corrupt will, and how sharply that will is bent toward evil? Or with the need for God to rescue us from that will, lest we perish? 

If my salvation or sanctification depended on my own ability and willingness to "refrain" from what is evil and "not refrain" from what is good, I suspect that there would be no hope at all for me. 

Romans 7:24-25a  Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!

May those who downplay the need for grace in these matters find themselves desperately longing for the only Redeemer who can rescue us from the results of our own ability and will.

Beza's 38 Aphorisms: A Concise & Pointed Defense of the Reformed Doctrine of Providence

Calling all "theology nerds"!

Although I am generally not a big fan of Theodore Beza's supralapsarianism, this is nonetheless a key Reformed text that deserves our attention and consideration. As a systematic articulation of divine sovereignty and a sound Biblical/philosophical defense of the Reformed doctrine of Providence, these 38 Aphorisms answer directly the false assertions of modern-day anti-Calvinists such as Leighton Flowers. If I was in serious debate with Flowers, I would ask him whether he has read this text and how he answers it, since it directly contradicts his misreading and misrepresentation of the prevailing Calvinistic viewpoint on these matters. Although these statements are dense and demanding of thoughtful reflection, a careful reading is well worth the time and mental effort involved. Right from the start, you will see how this text influenced the Westminster Confession of Faith and the London Baptist Confession of 1689. The many Biblical citations are helpful, too.

HT: http://www.covenanter.org/reformed/2015/8/17/theodore-bezas-thirty-eight-aphorisms-against-castalio and http://www.truecovenanter.com/supralapsarian/beza_against_castalion.html

Presented here for your edification and strengthening in the faith—enjoy!

Thirty-Eight Aphorisms against Castalio.

FOR THE STOPPING OF THE MOUTHES OF THE SLAUNDEROUS, AS ALSO FOR THE FURTHER INSTRUCTING OF THE IGNORANT, IN THIS BOTH NECESSARIE AND COMFORTABLE DOCTRINE OF GOD HIS ELECTION, I HAUE THOUGHT GOOD HERE TO SET DOWN A SHORTE SUMME OF THE WHOLE MATTER, CONTAINED IN CERTAINE BRIEFE & PLAINE APHORISMES, TRANSLATED OUT OF A LEARNED TREATISE OF THEODORUS BEZA, AGAINST CASTALION.

Translated by Iohn Stockwood

1. GOD worketh effectually, or bringeth all things to pass according to the counsel of his own will.

2. This counsel doth God execute or fulfill at certain moments of times: yet the counsel itself is everlasting, and going before all things, not only in time, inasmuch as it is before all time, but also in order. For otherwise the will of God should not be the chief rule of the counsel of God: but rather the qualities of things foreseen & foreknown, and driving God to take this or that counsel, should prescribe or appoint a rule to the will of God.

3. This counsel cannot be separated from the will of God, but that we must rob God of his divinity or Godhead.

4. This counsel is not put only in the governing and guiding of the event or that, that cometh to pass, as Pallas is feigned of the Poet to turn away Pandarus Dart from Menelaus breast unto his nether parts fenced with his belt: but hath a working & effectual strength in all things, which Paul hath declared by this word energein, Energein, which signifieth to work effectually.

5. This strength and efficacy is attributed unto God's working, but is not said to be of God. Therefore by this word [Efficacy or strength] is not declared any natural power given by God the Creator, to the things he hath created, that they should do this or that: but by this word is understood the power of God, which he hath in himself to do all things.

6. This universal particle, All, in the saying of Paul, can by no manner of exception at all be restrained, but that God in that point must be made to be idle, according to the opinion of Epicurus. And if we shall say that any thing is done against his will, he shall be robbed of his infinite, or endless power.

7. The conclusion thereof standeth, that God himself, according as it pleased him, to decree all things to come to pass from everlasting, even so also he bringeth them to pass by his power in their time as he willeth.

8. Yet of these things doth there follow none of these blasphemies, to wit, either that God is the Author of sin, either is delighted with iniquity, either willeth iniquity: or that Satan or man in doing of evil, do obey God, or, in that they do evil, they do that that God will, and therefore are without blame. Let all such blasphemies as these, be most far, not only from our tongues, but also from our cogitations or thoughts.

9. And thus it may be proved that these sequels and conclusions that they would gather of our doctrine, are of no force: God doth execute or perform the counsels of his will by second causes and instruments, not as bound unto them as the Stoics did suppose, but freely and mightily making, moving, and guiding them, as it pleased him.

10. Of these instruments there are two principal kinds. For some of them have life, to wit, such as are stirred by an inward moving of their own: others are without life and are only carried of an outward force by others rather than of themselves. Those instruments that have life are also in a double difference. For some of them are endued with judgment and reason, others are without reason, and are carried with a blind force of nature.

11. The instruments which are without life, yea and also they that have life, but are void of reason, are said to do neither well nor ill, because that they are rather caused to do, than to do of themselves: but they which use those instruments, are said to do either well or ill.

12. Instruments endued with reason and judgment, are either Angels, or men, and the same again of two sorts. For Angels, some are good, some are bad: and men by nature are all evil, but by grace there is such difference made between them, that some of them are wholly evil, and some of them are in part good, to wit, so far as the spirit of God hath sanctified or made them holy.

13. Such things as are of this sort, when as in any action they are moved by their own inward moving, are worthily said to work, and therefore in this kind of instruments only falleth the difference of well or ill doing. And in this respect, they cannot properly be called instruments, but rather efficient or working causes.

14. Now I call that an evil action, which hath not the revealed or opened will of God for the end: and contrariwise, I call it a good action which hath respect or looketh to the will of God.

15. The same, albeit they be causes, so far as they work by their own proper motion, yet in another respect they are called instruments, to wit, as often and so far forth as they are moved by another. As when the hangman by the commandment of the Magistrate, killeth a man, or when as by impulsion or setting on of the Devil, men hurt one another: or when as at the commandment, and in the name of any, we do either good or evil unto any man.

16. In this kind of actions, all men see that one & the same work is attributed unto two, to wit, unto the one as to him that moveth, and worketh by another, as by an instrument, and to the other, as to him that worketh himself, for he is in such sort an instrument, that he also worketh by his own inward motion, and not simply, as the Hammer or Axe in the hand of the Smith.

17. Yea, for this double respect, a double work seemeth sometime to be done, insomuch that the one may be laudable or praiseworthy, and the other wicked: as if the Magistrate deliver a man that is an offender unto the hangman to be executed, there is no man but will worthily praise this work: but if the hangman being moved with hatred or covetousness, or any other wicked lust, rather than looking unto the commandment of the Judge, do kill the same offender, certainly before God he cannot escape the crime of murder.

18. Now let us apply these things unto God, whose efficacy or strength, we have proved before to step in, in all things that are done without exception, and in such sort, that by those things which he hath created as by instruments, he doth execute or perform in his time, whatsoever he hath decreed from everlasting.

19. Whatsoever God doth is good, seeing from him, which is the chief good, no evil can proceed. But he doth all things. All things therefore are good, so far forth as they are done by God. And that difference of good and evil, hath only place in the instruments, and in those of whom we have spoken in the thirteenth proposition.

20. For if these instruments be good, and do look unto the opened will of God, they work well, and God also worketh well by them: whereby it cometh to pass, that, that work is always good: as when good Angels do that which God commandeth, and holy men follow, God calling them.

21. Evil instruments (evil I say, not by creation, but by corruption) insofar as they work, they do always work evil, and therefore they worthily incur or run into God's anger: but so far forth as God worketh by them, they do serve to the good work of God, either against their wills, or else of ignorance. For God, by what instruments soever he worketh, worketh always well.

22. Now he so worketh by those instruments, as he doth not only suffer them to work, neither only moderate or rule the event or thing that falleth out, but also he raiseth them up, stirreth, moveth, guideth, and that which is greatest of all he createth them, to the end that he might work by them, which he hath appointed: all which things God doth rightly, and without any injustice.

23. For as often as one evil man sinneth either against himself, or against another wicked person, God without any sin maketh, either that the evil man taketh vengeance upon himself, or that evil men shall punish other evil men, with such punishment as they have deserved: both which works of God are most righteous: and by such examples of his judgments, God lifteth up and comforteth those that are his.

24. But so often as wicked men do hurt the good, the wicked men sin, & in the end, suffer such punishments as they have deserved: yet nevertheless, by them the Lord chasteneth, instructeth and strengtheneth his own, and plainly by the open enemies of his Church maketh his Church glorious.

25. Yet cannot these evil instruments be said to obey God, because albeit God by them bringeth his work to pass, yet they, so far as in them is, and as concerning their own counsel and will, do not the work of God, but their own work for the which they are justly punished. For albeit whatsoever God worketh by the wicked be good, yet whatsoever the wicked work is evil.

26. Neither is this consequent or reason good, God worketh all things, therefore he worketh sin. For the guilt of sin agreeth not but to the vicious and faulty quality, which is wholly in the working instrument.

27. By reason of this corrupted quality, the work which of itself is but one, is made some manner of way twofold and double, insomuch that the one, that is the just work of God, directly fighteth against the other, that is, the unjust work of man.

28. Yet God worketh otherwise by the good instruments than by the evil, for besides that he worketh his work by the good instruments, the good instruments also do work their own work by the same force & efficacy which the Lord giveth unto them: finally the Lord worketh his work by them, and also worketh in them to will & to perform. But by the wicked, as by Satan, or by men, insofar as they are not regenerate or born anew, as often as the Lord executeth or performeth the just counsels and decrees of his everlasting will, he indeed sheweth forth his strength and efficacy in his work by them, either not knowing of it, or against their wills and purposes: but yet insofar as they work their own work, the Lord worketh not in them, but letteth loose the reins unto Satan, to whom by his just judgment he giveth them over being wicked, to be moved and stirred forward, that they may be carried away of their own will and his.

29. Therefore we do not refuse this term, suffering, or granting, neither yet came it in our minds, to say that God so worketh in the evil, as he doth in the good. But because that Sophisters have corrupted the difference of will and sufferance, which Augustine no doubt took of the Greeks, and they received from Augustine, therefore do we flatly refuse it.

30. For the Sophisters set will against permission, or sufferance: whereof doth follow that God suffereth the things which he suffereth, either against his will, or at leastwise being idle,& not caring for them. But contrariwise, lest we should either take from God his endless and unmeasurable power, or after the opinion of the Epicures, say as the thing indeed is, that God neither worketh anything by instruments, but willingly, nor yet suffereth the instruments to work, but willingly, yet in such sort that whatsoever he worketh, he worketh most justly, and whatsoever he permitteth or suffereth, he most justly suffereth.

31. And God worketh in respect of his own work: and permitteth or suffereth in respect of the work that the evil instruments do of their own accord work, or insofar as they are active and not passive instruments, that we may keep the terms used in the schools. Yet doth God justly suffer the thing that these instruments unjustly work, for because that sins, insofar as they are suffered by God that willeth, are not sins: but punishments of sin. For with GOD it is a just thing to punish sins with sins. But these selfsame actions insofar as they come from satan, and evil men provoked by Satan and their own concupiscence or lust, are so far sins, which the Lord in his time doth justly punish. For the Lord doth never suffer sins so far as they are sins, nay he doth always forbid them.

32. Neither is this consequence or reason good: God willeth all things, therefore he alloweth all things. For he willeth many things, and therefore suffereth them, not because he simply alloweth of them, but after a certain sort, for he alloweth them, so far as he suffereth them, even so far as they are no sins, as we said even now: But he disalloweth & punisheth them, so far as he hath respect or looketh unto the evil instruments, whose actions they are.

33. These are Augustine's words, Enchirid. ad Laurent. Cap. 100. "Great are the works of the Lord, for they are excellent in all his wills, so that after a wonderful and unspeakable manner that cometh not to pass besides his will, which is done against his will: because it should not come to pass if he would not suffer it: and doubtless he suffereth it not unwilling, but willing." The same Augustine, Lib. 5. Contr. Julian. Cap. 3. When as he had of purpose disputed against them which make an idle foreknowledge or sufferance, at length he bursteth forth into these words, "We doubtless (saith he) if we suffer those over whom we have power, to do wickedness before our eyes, shall be guilty with them. But how innumerable things doth he suffer (speaking of God) To be done before his eyes, which doubtless if he would not, he would by no means suffer? And yet he is both just and good."

34. The whole Scripture beareth witness, and very common sense or reason doth tell us, that without the will of God nothing is done, no not of those things which seem most chiefly to come to pass by chance or fortune, as Gen. 27.20, God is said quickly to have brought the prey unto Jacob's hands. And Ex. 21.13, As often as murder is committed at unawares, the Lord, saith Moses, caused him to come into thine hands. The selfsame thing is taught as concerning the falling out of Lots, Prov. 16.33. As concerning all the counsels of men, Dan. 4.32. Of the falling of Sparrows, Matt. 10.29. To be short, of all things without exception, Eph. 1.11.

35. And that the will of God, yea and the same most effectually, doth then also step in, when as he worketh by the wicked, may plainly appear almost in every leaf of the scripture. So is he said to have sent Joseph into Egypt, Gen. 45.8. So he stirred up Pharaoh to declare his power in him, Exod. 4.21. So he gave David's wives unto his son Absalom, 2 Sam. 12.11. So he moved the heart of David to number the people, 2 Sam. 24.1. So he commanded Shimei to curse David, 2 Sam. 16.10. So David calleth his enemies the sword & hand of the Lord, Psalm 17.13,14. So the Lord calleth the Medes and Persians his sanctified, and the instruments of his wrath, Isa. 10.5, and 13.6. So he calleth the falling away of the ten Tribes his work, 2 Chron. 11.4. So Job saith, the Lord giveth, and the Lord hath taken away, Job 1.21. So the king of Babylon is compared unto an Axe and a Saw, to wit, because the Lord executed or brought to pass his work by him, thinking on no such thing, Isa. 10.15. So the godly are afflicted or troubled, by the will and Predestination, or foreordaining of God, Rom. 8.29, and 1 Pet. 3.17, and 4.19. So there is no evil in the City which the Lord hath not done, Amos 3.6, and Jeremiah, Lam. 3.37,38. Who is he then, (saith he) which hath said, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord hath not commanded? Out of the mouth of the Lord proceedeth there not good and evil?

36. Go to then, let for example be chosen the most excellent, and also the most wicked deed that ever was: The most excellent, if we behold either both the endless justice, and mercy of the father, or the infinite obedience and love of the son: But the most wicked, if we consider the instruments themselves, to wit, Satan, Judas, the Jews, Pilate, and Herod. This deed (we speak of) is, the death of the son of God, full of cruelty and reproach. In this fact, if we deny the everlasting counsel of God to have stepped in, we shall be convinced or proved to speak false by infinite testimonies of the Scripture. For sure it is, that we were not chosen before the foundations of the world were laid, but only in him appointed to die, Eph. 1.4, and 1 Pet. 1.20. Wherefore he is also called the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world, Rev. 13.8, To wit, not only by the foreknowledge, but especially by the determined counsel of God, insomuch that Herod and Pilate, although thinking of no such thing, yet therefore came together, to fulfill such things as the hand and counsel of the Lord had decreed be done, Acts 4.28. Therefore he could not be taken but at his hour, John 7.30, and 8.29, and 12.27. For he was delivered by the determined counsel of God, and decree before going, Acts 2.23. And was wounded of God for our iniquities, Isa. 53.5. For God is he who spared not his own son, but gave him for us all, Rom. 8.32. Therefore if there were but this one example of God's everlasting providence, which never is idle, it were abundant enough to suffice, to convince, or reprove all those which falsely cry out, that God is made the author of sin, when as we say that nothing cometh to pass, but by the righteous will of God.

37. And yet do we not therefore excuse but rather most sharply accuse Satan working in the disobedient children, (Eph. 2.2.) Even then also when as the Lord most effectually, or strongly, and most justly bringeth his work to pass, both by Satan himself, and also by the bond slaves of Satan, 2 Tim. 2.26. Wherefore we do everywhere acknowledge and reverence the goodness and judgments of God, albeit the reason of them many times do not to us appear. And we condemn both the instruments which are evil, and also naughty and wicked actions, to wit, all the counsels and subtleties of Satan: the envy of Joseph's brethren, and the selling of their brother: the ungodliness and hardness of Pharaoh: Absalom's mind bent to kill his Father, and his detestable incest: the unadvisedness also of David himself: the wickedness of Shimei: the malice and treachery of David's enemies: the wicked falling away of Jeroboam, and the ten Tribes: the ravenny [violent plundering] of the Chaldeans: the insatiable covetousness, incredible Lechery, intolerable arrogancy of the Babylonians. To be short, all the wicked counsels, and most savage cruelty of the ungodly against the Church.

38. It is also manifest by very many and most plain testimonies of the scripture, that God doth punish sins with sins, and that with no idle, but very strong and effectual, yet notwithstanding, most just permission or sufferance. For it is he that giveth kings in his anger, Hos. 13.11, Neh. 9.37, and Job 34.30. It is he that causeth to err, Isa. 63.17. Because he mingleth amongst them the spirit of error, Isa. 19.14. It is he which hardeneth and turneth the hearts, which blindeth the eyes, which maketh drunk with the wine of giddiness, Exod. 4.21, and 7.3, and 9.12, and 10.1, and 11.10, and 14.4, Deut. 2.29, Josh. 11.20, and 1 Sam. 2.25, and 2 Chron. 22.7, Psalm 105.25. It is he that punisheth his contempt, giving men up into a reprobate mind, Rom. 1.28, And sending the strength of error to believe a lie, 2 Thes. 2.11. It is he which deceiveth Prophets, Ezek. 14.9. Finally, it is he that sendeth also evil spirits, giving them commandment to hurt, & granting them also efficacy or power to deceive, as 1 Kings 22.22,23, and 2 Chron. 18.21,22, Job 1.12, and 2.6.

       Thesethingsbeeingthusmani-
fest by these so plaine testimonies, let the Pellagians,    Freewillians,    Annabaptistes,  Papistes,  and the rest of that filthie rabble, crye out if they liste, till they ware hoarse, and their heartes ake againe, that wee make G O D the Authour of sinne, from which blasphemie wee are as farre, as they are voide of Christian charitie,  insoiudging of us,  ascribinguntoG O D   hisprouidence the whole swinge in all things, which as they proceede from him (as hath beene shewed before) are verie
good, albeit in respecte of the in-
struments, whereby it pleaseth
him in iustice sometime
to worke by, they
may be verie
evill.

FINIS.

True Calvinist Confessions: "I am a Casual Determinist."

As a committed Calvinist, I unashamedly advocate Casual Determinism. I would venture to say that every sincere Calvinist who holds to Biblical truth should be (and probably is) a Casual Determinist.

Please note that I am not talking about "Causal Determinism," nor am I advocating that philosophical viewpoint. I am discussing and arguing for a Biblical position of Casual Determinism.

What is Casual Determinism?

First of all, what do we mean by determinism? This can be defined as the belief that all events are pre-determined to occur. There are various kinds of "determinisms," which are variously advocated by philosophers and theologians of different stripes. The opposing position, Libertarianism (also known as a belief in "Libertarian Free Will"), holds that it is wholly impossible that events for which human beings may be held responsible are pre-determined. Even a casual reading of the Bible, much less a sound program of exegetical study, would seem to decisively demolish the "Libertarian" viewpoint.

In general, Calvinists (along with conservative Lutherans and others who hold to a high view of Scripture) are considered to be Determinists because they believe that God pre-determines everything. However, while we hold this conviction with tenacity and deeply conscientious devotion, we reserve the right to be rather casual about the details. Thus, we are Casual Determinists. We seek to affirm what is clear from Scripture, and not to go beyond what is written.

In other words . . .
1. We acknowledge that there is a great deal of mystery regarding God's pre-determination of everything.
2. We recognize a clear distinction between the pre-determination of good and the pre-determination of evil. God delights in good. He hates evil. He pre-determines both, but in different ways. While He may pre-determine evil, He never commits it nor approves of it. As for good, He alone is its source and author. Get it?
3. Along with Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, et al, we affirm God's absolute sovereignty without denying the voluntary choice and moral responsibility of human beings.

What are the Benefits of Casual Determinism?

1. Philosophical and theological arguments against causal determinism are rendered powerless because Casual Determinism may or may not entail Causal Determinism.
2. We do not have to deny human freedom in order to affirm divine determinism. We are quite casual in recognizing the fact that some type of genuine human freedom exists alongside determinism. And we do not need to solve all of the mysteries of the universe in order to affirm what the Bible clearly teaches.
3. We can interpret all events through the lens of God's absolute sovereignty.
4. We can speak of circumstances and human choices in the same ways the Biblical authors spoke of them, without feeling that we are somehow attributing evil to God or somehow denying His sovereignty.

We can be rather casual in our determinism because GOD is GOD, His Word is TRUE, and it is not our job to know everything.

Our role is to study His Word, worship His majesty, trust His wisdom, follow Christ, and proclaim His Truth. Regarding these things, we are anything but casual!

Both Determined and Free? A Conversation with Dr. Roger Olson

Recently I have been enjoying some conversation with Roger Olson, the "irenic Arminian" theologian and scholar, at his blog. I always find conversation with Dr. Olson to be interesting and informative. He is one of my favorite non-Calvinist discussion partners, although we disagree rather thoroughly in many areas. 

We have recently engaged profitably in discussion in the comment box at this post on Dr. Olson's blog:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/11/the-ultimate-horror-story-reflections-on-stephen-kings-new-novel-revival-spoiler-alert/

Today, Dr. Olson has responded to me directly with this blog post:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/12/can-a-single-act-be-both-determined-and-free/

I have posted my reply, as follows:

Dr. Olson, 

Thank you for giving attention to this important issue, which seems to be a key point of disagreement between Calvinistic and Arminian/non-Calvinistic thought.
Like most other Calvinists, I would point to multiple "fine distinctions" in order to sustain the appeal to compatibilism.

I would begin by defining compatibilism a little differently, as the basic belief that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. The theory that "freedom" is being free to do as one chooses despite having no ability to do otherwise is just one form of compatibilism among many interesting options. Personally, I do not prefer that approach, and only oppose "Libertarian Free Will" or "power of contrary choice" to the extent that they, by definition, rule out compatibilism (in the broad sense). I agree with your contention that "free will" is mysterious, that it is "situated" within a context of limitations, that it is fully realized only by Christian conversion, and I believe that it is much more "genuine" than most of today's Calvinists will admit. Augustine was not afraid to use the term, and even Calvin hinted at a broader freedom of choice. There was a stream of historic Reformed thought along this line (Jeongmo Yoo has an interesting book on this topic).

Next, I would appeal to a distinction between "natural ability" and "moral ability" in saying that we are naturally capable of choosing other than we do, even if not morally capable (thus, in some sense we have the power of contrary choice). I have the natural ability to give away my possessions or to steal, but I might only have the moral ability to do one of them in a given set of circumstances. I don't have the natural or moral ability to choose to jump to the moon (although I do have the ability to attempt to jump to the moon). Moral ability is limited, not necessarily by God's decree, but by our own will (or moral character). In essence, ironically, the very will to choose is what limits the range of choices!

Finally, I would appeal to a distinction within God's secret decree between the foreordination of good and the foreordination of evil. Good arises always with God's direct action and involvement, by grace, and not from the creature alone. Evil arises only with God's inaction, from the creature's own moral nature, as God permits the creature to act on its own independent will. In other words, He ordains to allow evil to occur apart from His own direct action, by permission only (yet with complete foreknowledge and a design to permit--and then remedy--all of the evil that occurs). Thus, nothing happens because it is merely pre-determined. Good happens by God's predestination, providence and promise, while evil happens by His permitted purpose (with both good and evil being thus pre-determined in some sense, and worked into His overarching plan). As you know, the origin of the first evil remains mysterious on these grounds; however, we would categorically deny any possibility or implication that evil arose from God Himself (perish the thought).

This is, of course, a very abbreviated form of a more complex argument (actually an entire philosophical construct) that is employed by Augustinian thinkers to explain how God could foreordain (or decree, pre-determine/pre-program, etc.) all things without ever touching, committing, positively willing or becoming culpable for moral evil. There are plenty of Calvinists, Lutherans, and other Augustinians, who can expound these topics much better than I.

As a concluding note, I want to make it clear that I am not attempting to refute what you have written or formally debate the issue (doubtless you would outmaneuver me!). We are laying out two very different and incompatible philosophical approaches that are employed to make our theologies tenable in our own minds. As a part of my ongoing education and understanding of the Arminian viewpoint, I very much appreciate your time and care in stating your position clearly, and in treating the other position charitably. Great stuff!

Blessings in Christ,
Derek

PUPPETS: Another Epic Calvinist-Arminian "Debate"

Having a little "chat" with some Arminian brothers over here:
http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2014/01/06/muppet-calvinism

I do not know how I get myself into these tangles. Well, maybe I do know how, and should instead wonder "why?" Admittedly, it was hard to resist commenting on the graphic that was posted as a discussion starter:

Lovely Caricature, eh?

Whatever the case, the discussion may be helpful for those who want to understand how the Bible affirms human freedom in compatibility with a robust, meticulous and exhaustive divine sovereignty. The question on the table is: "Does Calvinistic theology make man into a mere puppet?"

A proper understanding of Calvinistic theology (the non-hyper variety), divine sovereignty, human responsibility and Biblical compatibilism (which is not necessarily equivalent to the many forms of philosophical compatibilism) will lead to a decisive "NO" on this question. However, some who argue against Calvinism delight in throwing up the old canard of "Your theology makes us into puppets!"

I would like to take a moment to roundly scold those vocal Calvinist apologists who haven't sufficiently nuanced their compatibilism, and would seem to lend support to the charge. While I am at it, I'll also scold those Arminians who know what Calvinistic theology teaches and refuse to admit that their puppet analogy is a ridiculous caricature.

Then again, who in this world even cares if some obscure Calvinist scolds them?

II Samuel 7:18 Then King David went in and sat before the LORD and said, “Who am I, O Lord GOD, and what is my house, that you have brought me thus far?

Myths About Calvinism: There Are No Real Choices

The following article was written by Stephen Altrogge, and posted on his site, THE BLAZING CENTER.


Myths About Calvinism: There Are No Real Choices
By Stephen Altrogge 
Click here to see the original post at Stephen's site.

________________________________________________

Alright, I confess: I’m a Calvinist. Do you still like me? Will you still invite me over for you Super Bowl party? Will you still be my Facebook friend? Can we still do piano duets (I don’t play the piano, but if I did I would want to play duets)? I sure hope so.

But what exactly does it mean to be a Calvinist? There is a lot of confusion and misinformation and downright misrepresentation when it comes to Calvinism. Depending on who you talk to, a Calvinist is someone who:

1) Believes God hates everyone (see Westboro Baptist Church).

2) Believes God has chosen people to be saved, and no matter what a person does, nothing can change that choice.

3) Is grumpy, sour, and always making sure everyone else is obeying the rules.

4) Doesn’t believe in evangelism because God has already chosen people to be saved.

Over the next several posts I want to address several common myths regarding Calvinism, and explain how I, a Calvinist, respond to those myths.

The first, and probably most prevalent myth regarding Calvinism, has to do with free will and choices. The argument goes something like this: If God has predestined people to be saved then people don’t have a free will, and our choices for or against God are not real choices. 

I get this argument, I really do. In some ways, it’s the logical extension of the doctrine of predestination. If God does the choosing, that must mean we don’t do any real choosing. Am I right? After all, who can resist the will of the Almighty God?

Slight problem though: the Bible makes it crystal clear that God predestines people for salvation AND that every person is responsible to choose Jesus Christ. This is a paradox for which the Bible make no apologies, and a paradox which every true Calvinist gladly embraces.

Ephesians 1:4-6 says:

In love he predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of his glorious grace, with which he has blessed us in the Beloved.

I don’t know how much clearer you can get when it comes to the doctrine of election. If I am a Christian it is because God predestined me, before the ages began, to be adopted as a son. He did not predestine me because of anything good or bad I would do. He predestined me according to the purpose of his will. This fills me with gratefulness.

These kinds of words run throughout the entirety of Scripture. Romans 8:29-30 says:

For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.

This passage forms an unbreakable chain. Before the foundation of the world God, foreknew those whom he would be predestine for salvation. Those whom he predestines are always called, those whom he calls are always justified, and those whom he justifies are always ultimately glorified. This is completely God’s doing. He gets all the credit and all the glory. From beginning to end, God does the saving. Scripture couldn’t be more clear on this subject.

But Scripture also makes it clear that every man and woman is responsible before God to repent of their sins and believe in Jesus Christ. Jesus began his ministry by proclaiming: “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” In Luke 5:31-32 Jesus said to the Pharisees:

Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. I have not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance.

In Acts 2, after preaching to the Jews on the day of Pentecost, Peter called his listeners to repentance:

Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.

True Calvinism embraces the unconditional election of God. The Bible makes no apologies for the fact that God elects specific men and women to be saved apart from any conditions within them. God is God, and he is free to do whatever he pleases. The clay cannot say to the Potter, “Why have you made me this way?”

True Calvinism also embraces the real need for repentance. This is not some sort of tricky word game God is playing. Every man and woman is commanded to turn from their sins and choose God. The choices we make for God or against God are real choices, and we will really be held accountable for those choices.

How do God’s sovereign, electing purposes, and man’s free will work together? I’m not sure. The Bible doesn’t spell it out in detail. It gives us some hints as to how they work together, but it doesn’t ever clearly answer the question. As a Calvinist, I fully embrace God’s sovereign perogative to choose whomever he pleases. I also fully embrace every person’s responsibility to repent. I find the following quotes from Charles Spurgeon helpful in this matter:

I believe that God will save his own elect. And I also believe that if I do not preach the gospel, the blood of men will be laid at my door.

I am quite certain that God has an elect people, for he tells me so in his word. And I am equally certain that everyone who comes to Christ shall be saved, for that also is his own declaration in the Scriptures. When people ask me how I reconcile these two truths, I usually say that there is no need to reconcile them, for they have never yet quarreled with one another.

The true Calvinist believes that election and free salvation do not quarrel with one another.

Arranged Marriages

I asked my daughter: "Should we have arranged marriages, or should we be allowed to marry someone we love?" 

She thought for a moment, and then shouted: "FALSE DICHOTOMY!"

"Very good." I said. After all, a marriage could be arranged between a man and woman who already love each other (perhaps some marriages are arranged this way unwittingly), or a marriage can be arranged between a man and woman who will grow to love each other. Real love and arranged marriage are not mutually exclusive (I am not saying we should practice this, by the way).

Next I said, "Now, imagine that I am both omnisicient and omnipotent. Could I pre-arrange a marriage for you with someone you love?"

"Of course you could, if you were God!" She said. After thinking it through for another moment or two, her face lit up and she exclaimed, "Hey, wait a minute . . . ALL MARRIAGES ARE ARRANGED!"

I smiled.

She had expressed a brilliant, simple, and thoroughly Biblical thought. Every marriage, including the most loving marriage on earth, is an arranged marriage. And most every marriage can be a genuinely loving one.

So, how is it that my 12-year-old daughter understands compatibilism so much better than the Arminian apologists I meet online? Why can't they see through the false dichotomy of "foreordained" and "free"? They tell me it is a "contradiction" (and much worse). I wonder, do they think God is too limited in His power, or wisdom, or freedom, or knowledge, or ability, or love, to accomplish such a wonderful thing?

The End of a Long and Interesting Debate

For several weeks now, I have been engaged in discussion with a non-Calvinist brother named Matt. Matt has taken a position of incompatibilism, stating that God cannot both sovereignly foreordain all things and simultaneously permit evil to occur through the exercise of genuine freedom on the part of the creature. He believes Calvinism makes God the "author of evil" and leaves man without moral freedom or responsibility. As one might expect, I argue that this understanding is incorrect.

Thus far, there have been 26 separate volleys in this informal debate, which originally took place in the comments at this post: http://atheologyintension.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/2376/

Matt has also taken the time to post each comment as a separate blog post on his site.

Below is my final summary response. I would imagine Matt will reply to this, and that his response will be the end of our discussion (for now, at least). Here is my closing argument:

Matt, 

Thank you for taking time to reply and for all of the work you have undertaken in reorganizing our comments into individual posts. 

I will make a few final comments here, and then leave off. This has been a most interesting exchange, and I am grateful for the time and thoughtful attention you have given to it. 

You can imagine my disappointment in finding your last two posts fraught with the same mischaracterizations of Calvinism that prompted me to write to you in the first place. Here on posts numbers 24 and 25, you demonstrate a total misunderstanding of key Calvinist convictions, proving to me that I have utterly failed to dislodge these misapprehensions from your mind. Throughout our discussion, and especially in these latest posts, you present Calvinism in an utterly inaccurate way, and as a theological position which would actually be blasphemous, heretical, destructive, and entirely inconsistent with Scripture, if the position was actually held by anyone. I cannot think of any mainstream Calvinist who has ever held to the kind of belief you define as Calvinism. Even many hyper Calvinists would cringe at some of the propositions you tell us Calvinists must affirm. 

As such, I find your sudden shift to a demand for “argumentation,” rather than “assertion,” to be curious. Your persistently repeated misstatements about the beliefs of Calvinists have prompted me to attempt to clarify what Calvinists actually believe versus what you claim they believe. This is, of course, not a matter of mere logical proof, but of historical analysis. I chose not to inundate you with endless quotations proving that real Calvinists don’t actually believe what you say they believe. A visit to calvinandcalvinism.com will provide veritable mountains of proof. Therefore, beyond the following quotation, I will simply suggest you study the actual beliefs of dozens of historic Calvinist leaders, from the Reformation onward, which have been carefully documented at that site. Best of all, everything there is surrounded by extensive context in order to lessen the possibility of misinterpretation. 

Here is what the Westminster Confession explicitly states concerning God’s sovereign foreordination and the origin of evil: 

“The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God so far manifest themselves in His providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering, and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to His own holy ends; yet so, as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God, who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin.” (WCF 5.4) 

This is what Calvinists actually believe. The Calvin and Calvinism site referenced above will show you various ways Reformed thinkers have logically reasoned through the implications. You may say that this is self-contradictory and impossible. To you, perhaps it is. To them, and to me, it is not. 

Note that the WCF does not deny permission of sin, but affirms it, insisting that the permission is not without God’s bounding, ordering and governing of the sins that are permitted. You have stated that the language of permission is an Arminian approach. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I don’t think the WCF is an Arminian creed. Can you now see, from the WCF, that the language of permission is actually, historically speaking, a stock Calvinist answer to the question, and that this is exactly opposite to the beliefs you presented as “Calvinism”? Frankly, if Calvinism was what you claim it is, I would join you in staunchly opposing it. I would actually go further and condemn its adherents as anti-Christian heretics. Fortunately, Calvinism takes a position exactly opposite to the one you say it affirms regarding the goodness of God and the origin of evil. 

Throughout our discussion, I have argued from numerous Biblical texts that the Calvinist’s position is both reasonable and logical. You do not accept my arguments, and that is okay with me. But it would be dishonest for you to claim I haven’t presented arguments for my position. 

You have asserted that Scripture itself is not sufficient to decide the question under consideration, and have demanded logical proof and argumentation, insisting that these are sufficient to determine the question. In my view, you have elevated human reason above Scripture by discounting the possibility that direct Biblical propositions can settle the question, and implying instead that the reasonings of your own mind can settle it. My position on this is reciprocal to yours. I hold that clear Biblical propositions DO undeniably settle the matter, whether or not the reasonings of my mind (or yours) can attain to the divine logic undergirding the divinely revealed answer. In other words, my core epistemological presupposition is that Scripture itself is more reliable and trustworthy than fallible human logic. I am honestly surprised that you disagree on this point (although it is possible that I have misunderstood your position on this). 

Matt, it is unfortunate that you misrepresent my views on logic and paradox in a way strikingly similar to the way you misrepresent Calvinism. The reason may be that I have not explained well enough, or that you have honestly misunderstood, and hope it boils down to one these (or a combination of both). Here again, I can only seek to clarify my position and argue from Scripture. 

I can certainly appreciate the logic of your arguments and illustrations regarding things like “married bachelors,” etc. My answer to all of this is simple: matters of divine ordination and human freedom cannot be oversimplified in this way. Sure, there are plenty of either/or dichotomies in our world. Married or not married. Pregnant or not pregnant. Speeding or not speeding. Everyone understand this. However, the existence of either/or dichotomies does not invalidate the possibility of both/and synergies (which are sometimes presented as false dichotomies). What about this one: square or circle? In two dimensions, this really is an either/or dichotomy. But in three dimensions, we have the cylinder, a “square circle.” We also have square triangles (pyramids) and circular triangles (cones). So . . . what if we human beings could only conceive of two dimensions, and an all-knowing God who sees three dimensions told us something is both square and circle? Would we argue with Him, and say that His claim is illogical? Or would we trust that on His level of understanding it is possible for a cylinder to exist? Stated simply, I view divine ordination and human freedom not as a married vs. bachelor issue, but as a square vs. circle issue. We see squares and circles where God sees cylinders. And again I ask, what prevents God from being able to do things like this? Is He not on a higher level than we are? Is He not wiser? Smarter? More knowledgeable? More capable? 

You may think all of this is illogical. You are free to think so. However, I just laid out a sound logical reason for you to affirm and trust God’s harmonious use of both foreordination and genuine human freedom. This is not all as simple as 2+2=4. We are dealing with infinities here. In human experience, we don’t have anything exactly like eternal, divine “ordination” to compare with or argue from. To fully understand exactly how all of this works, we would have to be eternal, divine, all-wise, all-good and all-powerful. I’m just guessing that those shoes don’t fit either one of us, Matt. 

Finally, I want to thank you once again for a challenging and enjoyable conversation. I pray you will be mightily used by God in the work He has given you to do, that you will continue to grow in your love for Christ and your knowledge of Him, and that your entire life will be blessed and prospered in Him. I also hope that a large cylinder shape is ordained to be set up somewhere in the New Creation, and that we may freely decide to meet under its shadow for a continuation of this discussion, with a fresh insight and understanding that magnificently humbles us both through a recognition of how little we actually apprehended when we engaged in this discussion. And there we shall worship the Lamb together! 

Until then, many blessings, brother. 

In Christ,
Derek Ashton

Calvinistic Compatibilism: A Discussion of Divine Causation, Human Freedom and Moral Responsibility

Below is an excerpt addressing the subject of divine causation and compatibilism. This has been adapted from a series of responses I recently shared with some non-Calvinist Christians who have taken an incompatibilist position (i.e. their belief is that God's pre-determination of everything is incompatible with human freedom of choice and moral responsibility). I argue here for the opposite view, that God's sovereign pre-determination of everything is perfectly compatible with human freedom of choice and moral responsibility for our actions. This is excerpted from an ongoing conversation in the comments at the following blog post:
http://atheologyintension.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/2376/

Dear Non-Calvinist friends:

You present an interesting argument. The main thrust seems to be that Reformed theology makes God the author of evil, and in so doing removes man's freedom and moral responsibility. This objection is not new; it has been a common challenge faced by Calvinistic thinkers for centuries. I believe the argument is flawed, and I will explain why in detail. First, here is a summary:

1. The argument fails to distinguish between hyper Calvinism and mainstream Calvinism
2. The argument is based on a faulty understanding of mainstream Calvinism, which affirms compatibilism rather than mere determinism.
3. The argument is based on a faulty understanding of compatibilism, which affirms human freedom and responsibility in addition to determinism.
4. The argument groundlessly assumes compatibilism is impossible and self-contradictory.
5. The argument is based rationalism rather than a sound, Biblical epistemology (theory of knowledge)
6. The argument gives undue credit to the human mind's ability to peer into the unrevealed. 
7. The Argument fails to present a Biblically and logically sound alternative to the Reformed approach, which it rejects based on multiple misunderstandings.

Historically, Calvinists have taken a variety of positions, from a VERY SOFT compatibilism to a VERY HARD determinism. You have quoted from several examples of this diversity. A.W. Pink (depending on the day of the week), Vincent Cheung and Gordon Clark are in the line of the more hyper brand of Calvinists, who are most likely to espouse the hardest form of determinism without apology. You extol this as being somehow more “consistent.” Others like Piper, Packer and Frame are more likely to express a compatibilism that affirms human freedom as a mystery within (and even upheld by) divine ordination. I have read Calvin’s discussion of free will in the Institutes; he is a textbook compatibilist, at least in that part of his writings.

So I think it is a bit unfair for you to say Calvinistic ordination always “collapses into causal determinism” and then disparage the softening statements of compatibilism offered by the more moderate voices in the group. This would be akin to me saying that an Arminian view of free will collapses into Pelagianism (or perhaps Open Theism), while ignoring the Classical Arminian’s affirmation of Total Depravity (which strongly inhibits – or rather, kills –  libertarian freedom), and Prevenient Grace (which ackowledges the deadness and – gratefully – affirms our need for divine grace). I prefer to view the more moderate/mainstream Calvinists’ softening statements as evidence of a commitment to Biblical balance, preventing them from falling into the philosophical trap of hard determinism (the kind hypers veritably revel in). I do not see the softening statements as logical contradictions, but an attempt to be consistent with Scripture, grounded in the humility that confesses God’s ways are superior to our highest intellect.

I cannot see how God can be God without ordaining all things. I find this inconceivable simply because it is contrary to His Word:

• Proverbs 16:9 The heart of man plans his way, but the LORD establishes his steps.
• Proverbs 19:21 Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the LORD that will stand.
• Proverbs 20:24 A man’s steps are from the LORD; how then can man understand his way?
• Isaiah 46:8-11 “Remember this and stand firm, recall it to mind, you transgressors, remember the former things of old; for I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose,’ calling a bird of prey from the east, the man of my counsel from a far country. I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass; I have purposed, and I will do it.”
• Eph 1:11 In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will …

At the same time I cannot see man’s God-given freedom as less than a genuine, morally responsible and unconstrained liberty. Here I am just agreeing with Calvin and other compatibilists. We insist that God can ordain everything without denying his creatures real freedom. We cannot turn from either of these conscientiously held convictions.

Photo borrowed from
www.tominthebox.net

One of the great difficulties in this discussion is the fact that you and I are speaking two very different philosophical languages. We embrace opposing assumptions and presuppositions (although I would guess we fundamentally agree that Scripture is inerrant and Christ alone saves, by grace alone through faith alone to the glory of God alone).

Your arguments presuppose that freedom of will is incompatible with God's pre-determinate counsel. If I agreed with this presupposition, I would find your arguments unassailable. However, do you have any way to prove that this really is the case? Do you have a Biblical argument to prove this?

My presupposition is that God's all-determining will, eternal decree, and continuous providential action are not at all incompatible with creaturely freedom of will. I see God's decree clearly taught in Scripture, so I cannot take that away without a total change of heart in terms of the exegesis. On the other hand, I live in a world in which I experience every moment the liberty of my choices. Uncoerced, unconstrained, and apparently including the ability to choose otherwise than I do. But alas, which am I to believe? God's Holy Word or my undeniable experience?

But there is more. Another aspect of my experience has been my absolute and unquenchable rebellion. Only God's sovereign grace could ever have changed my heart and altered my course. And yet by His grace I did not find myself constrained or forced to believe. I chose freely; yet I could (and would) only choose to believe in Christ by sovereign, irresistible grace.

Then again, God's Word commands me to choose and holds me responsible for the choices I make. It nevertheless says I can have no good thing (faith and repentance included) unless God grants it to me by His mercy.

So now I have God's Word on both sides, and my experience on both sides. What can I do but hold on to both of them? I can't explain how God sovereignly ordains all things and yet keeps me free to choose in ways that render me morally responsible, unconstrained, voluntarily motivated, and apparently not without other options.

So I find myself embracing compatibilism, the belief that there can be a pre-determination of everything by an incomprehensible God without any diminishment of natural human freedom and responsibility. A million "rational" arguments against it won't change my understanding of God's Word or my experiences.

To be clear, when I say a million “rational” arguments won’t convince me otherwise, I am referring to arguments that are purely based on human logic, and thus appear to be “rational,” yet do not take Biblical revelation into sufficient account. I would like to think that all of my Arminian brothers will agree heartily with me on this point.

We are getting down to the root issue here. If I understand your position correctly, you fundamentally disagree with the premise of Christian compatibilism (i.e., that God’s pre-determination of everything is compatible with [and not contradictory to] genuine human freedom), and you do not even think it remotely possible that it could be true.

That last part presents a very strong claim of assurance in the way divine sovereignty and human choices can relate to one another. You are not simply saying they DO NOT relate a compatibilistic way; you seem to be making the claim that they CAN NOT relate this way. The alternative would seem to be a view of divine sovereignty that does not involve pre-determination of everything. I wonder how you distinguish between those events that are pre-determined and those that aren’t? Or is nothing at all pre-determined by God?

Don't fall for "Teeter Totter" theology!

To me, these matters are a great mystery. I view God's sovereign decree and my freedom as much more complex than a mere philosophical "seesaw," which would entail that any gain on one side necessarily results in a corresponding loss on the other. I conceive of my freedom as existing within and being upheld by His all-determining sovereignty.

I find it fascinating that any thinking person would not consider the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human choices to be a mystery. In saying this, I should be careful to define my terms. By “mystery,” I mean an item or area of knowledge which God has not revealed to us explicitly through some means (e.g., the Bible, creation, etc.).

I should also reiterate my definition of “compatibilism,” as mentioned above. It is simply the belief that divine pre-determination of everything does not conflict with genuine human freedom of choice. Jonathan Edwards affirmed this, but also went much further by actually proposing a theory of how it all works. I am not doing that (at least not right now). Although I admire Edwards’ attempt, I don’t view the results as something “revealed by God,” and thus I cannot claim the matter is no longer mysterious to me simply because someone has come up with what they think is a great explanation. Someone else may come up with a better one. Even so, until God reveals this, it remains an area of uncertainty for compatibilistic Christians who regard the Bible as their highest epistemological authority.

So I don't see how compatibilism can ever "collapse" into mere determinism. It involves determinism, yes, certainly. But if you define determinism in a way that automatically rules out the possibility of genuine freedom, I can only say that my compatibilism does not involve that kind of determinism. I would actually join you in arguing against any determinism that rules out human freedom and responsibility. I would equally oppose any version of human freedom that rules out determinism. I refuse to close off these categories as if they are mutually exclusive, since there does not appear to be any compelling reason to do so from a Biblical, philosophical or experiential standpoint.

Do you think it is remotely possible that predestination and freedom are not mutually exclusive?

I am honestly amazed that anyone can have so strong an assurance in ruling out the mere possibility (that God could possibly establish His sovereignty and our choices in a compatibilistic way) that they would even cast accusations of “irrationalism” at those who do affirm it.

By the way, I have never argued that it is virtuous to accept things that don’t make sense. My clearly stated position is that it is sensible for Christians to accept all the teaching of the Scriptures – the whole counsel of God – even if they find some aspects hard to understand or explain.

However, I would challenge anyone to Biblically and logically demonstrate that it is impossible for God to use compatibilism in His administration of the universe. In essence, can you show me how the concept of God’s pre-determination of everything and the concept of human freedom, when taken together, result in a genuine contradiction?

I am not asking whether these concepts strike you as contradictory, if they feel contradictory, if they appear to be contradictory, etc. (or even if you find the idea to be dangerous from a practical standpoint). I am only asking for Biblical and logical proof that they ARE contradictory.

The person who tries to do this faces a very significant problem: GOD is included in the equation! We are discussing a partly unrevealed relationship of metaphysical concepts which involves God’s management of His creation, the relationships of time and eternity, God and humanity (not to mention angels/demons and other entities we may not even know about), choice and freedom, responsibility and volition, etc.

My contention is that the best Biblical and logical sense we can make of the situation (taking all of the Biblical data and our own experiences into account) is to affirm that God mysteriously works (and remember, by “mysterious” I mean something He hasn’t explicitly revealed to us) in such a way that human freedom exists in harmony with divine pre-determination.

I also believe that one can make a much stronger Biblical argument for compatibilism than for incompatibilism. But that is part of the reason I am a compatibilist.

As an addendum, I share many of your concerns regarding the potential ill effects of an imbalanced Calvinism. Much of this can be characterized as hyper Calvinism (I sometimes refer to “high[per] Calvinism,” meaning anyone, whether “high” or “hyper” in his views, who over-emphasizes certain logical implications at the expense of other matters clearly revealed in Scripture). I am not saying all High Calvinists are hyper or imbalanced; but imbalanced Calvinists are almost always High or hyper in their theology.

This is part of the reason I have embraced Moderate Calvinism, and devoted myself to deterring and opposing any form of Calvinism which:

• denies or downplays human responsibility
• calls God the author or direct cause of evil
• uses God’s sovereignty as an excuse for sin
• hinders evangelism/missions on the basis of election or other theological considerations
• leads to apathy in service and devotion
• elevates human logic above the revealed will of God

To be honest, I would rather serve alongside a consecrated, moderate, and fair-minded Arminian who is growing in godliness than a cold high(per) Calvinist who is complacent and arrogant. 

In my view, Calvinism “done right” will actually result in the opposite effects, and to a greater extent than any non-Calvinist philosophy will. That is my conviction, and part of the reason I am a Moderate/Paradoxical Calvinist.

Again, thank you for your thoughtful comments and interactions.