True Calvinist Confessions: "I am a Casual Determinist."

As a committed Calvinist, I unashamedly advocate Casual Determinism. I would venture to say that every sincere Calvinist who holds to Biblical truth should be (and probably is) a Casual Determinist.

Please note that I am not talking about "Causal Determinism," nor am I advocating that philosophical viewpoint. I am discussing and arguing for a Biblical position of Casual Determinism.

What is Casual Determinism?

First of all, what do we mean by determinism? This can be defined as the belief that all events are pre-determined to occur. There are various kinds of "determinisms," which are variously advocated by philosophers and theologians of different stripes. The opposing position, Libertarianism (also known as a belief in "Libertarian Free Will"), holds that it is wholly impossible that events for which human beings may be held responsible are pre-determined. Even a casual reading of the Bible, much less a sound program of exegetical study, would seem to decisively demolish the "Libertarian" viewpoint.

In general, Calvinists (along with conservative Lutherans and others who hold to a high view of Scripture) are considered to be Determinists because they believe that God pre-determines everything. However, while we hold this conviction with tenacity and deeply conscientious devotion, we reserve the right to be rather casual about the details. Thus, we are Casual Determinists. We seek to affirm what is clear from Scripture, and not to go beyond what is written.

In other words . . .
1. We acknowledge that there is a great deal of mystery regarding God's pre-determination of everything.
2. We recognize a clear distinction between the pre-determination of good and the pre-determination of evil. God delights in good. He hates evil. He pre-determines both, but in different ways. While He may pre-determine evil, He never commits it nor approves of it. As for good, He alone is its source and author. Get it?
3. Along with Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, et al, we affirm God's absolute sovereignty without denying the voluntary choice and moral responsibility of human beings.

What are the Benefits of Casual Determinism?

1. Philosophical and theological arguments against causal determinism are rendered powerless because Casual Determinism may or may not entail Causal Determinism.
2. We do not have to deny human freedom in order to affirm divine determinism. We are quite casual in recognizing the fact that some type of genuine human freedom exists alongside determinism. And we do not need to solve all of the mysteries of the universe in order to affirm what the Bible clearly teaches.
3. We can interpret all events through the lens of God's absolute sovereignty.
4. We can speak of circumstances and human choices in the same ways the Biblical authors spoke of them, without feeling that we are somehow attributing evil to God or somehow denying His sovereignty.

We can be rather casual in our determinism because GOD is GOD, His Word is TRUE, and it is not our job to know everything.

Our role is to study His Word, worship His majesty, trust His wisdom, follow Christ, and proclaim His Truth. Regarding these things, we are anything but casual!

Both Determined and Free? A Conversation with Dr. Roger Olson

Recently I have been enjoying some conversation with Roger Olson, the "irenic Arminian" theologian and scholar, at his blog. I always find conversation with Dr. Olson to be interesting and informative. He is one of my favorite non-Calvinist discussion partners, although we disagree rather thoroughly in many areas. 

We have recently engaged profitably in discussion in the comment box at this post on Dr. Olson's blog:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/11/the-ultimate-horror-story-reflections-on-stephen-kings-new-novel-revival-spoiler-alert/

Today, Dr. Olson has responded to me directly with this blog post:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/12/can-a-single-act-be-both-determined-and-free/

I have posted my reply, as follows:

Dr. Olson, 

Thank you for giving attention to this important issue, which seems to be a key point of disagreement between Calvinistic and Arminian/non-Calvinistic thought.
Like most other Calvinists, I would point to multiple "fine distinctions" in order to sustain the appeal to compatibilism.

I would begin by defining compatibilism a little differently, as the basic belief that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. The theory that "freedom" is being free to do as one chooses despite having no ability to do otherwise is just one form of compatibilism among many interesting options. Personally, I do not prefer that approach, and only oppose "Libertarian Free Will" or "power of contrary choice" to the extent that they, by definition, rule out compatibilism (in the broad sense). I agree with your contention that "free will" is mysterious, that it is "situated" within a context of limitations, that it is fully realized only by Christian conversion, and I believe that it is much more "genuine" than most of today's Calvinists will admit. Augustine was not afraid to use the term, and even Calvin hinted at a broader freedom of choice. There was a stream of historic Reformed thought along this line (Jeongmo Yoo has an interesting book on this topic).

Next, I would appeal to a distinction between "natural ability" and "moral ability" in saying that we are naturally capable of choosing other than we do, even if not morally capable (thus, in some sense we have the power of contrary choice). I have the natural ability to give away my possessions or to steal, but I might only have the moral ability to do one of them in a given set of circumstances. I don't have the natural or moral ability to choose to jump to the moon (although I do have the ability to attempt to jump to the moon). Moral ability is limited, not necessarily by God's decree, but by our own will (or moral character). In essence, ironically, the very will to choose is what limits the range of choices!

Finally, I would appeal to a distinction within God's secret decree between the foreordination of good and the foreordination of evil. Good arises always with God's direct action and involvement, by grace, and not from the creature alone. Evil arises only with God's inaction, from the creature's own moral nature, as God permits the creature to act on its own independent will. In other words, He ordains to allow evil to occur apart from His own direct action, by permission only (yet with complete foreknowledge and a design to permit--and then remedy--all of the evil that occurs). Thus, nothing happens because it is merely pre-determined. Good happens by God's predestination, providence and promise, while evil happens by His permitted purpose (with both good and evil being thus pre-determined in some sense, and worked into His overarching plan). As you know, the origin of the first evil remains mysterious on these grounds; however, we would categorically deny any possibility or implication that evil arose from God Himself (perish the thought).

This is, of course, a very abbreviated form of a more complex argument (actually an entire philosophical construct) that is employed by Augustinian thinkers to explain how God could foreordain (or decree, pre-determine/pre-program, etc.) all things without ever touching, committing, positively willing or becoming culpable for moral evil. There are plenty of Calvinists, Lutherans, and other Augustinians, who can expound these topics much better than I.

As a concluding note, I want to make it clear that I am not attempting to refute what you have written or formally debate the issue (doubtless you would outmaneuver me!). We are laying out two very different and incompatible philosophical approaches that are employed to make our theologies tenable in our own minds. As a part of my ongoing education and understanding of the Arminian viewpoint, I very much appreciate your time and care in stating your position clearly, and in treating the other position charitably. Great stuff!

Blessings in Christ,
Derek

Calvinistic Compatibilism: A Discussion of Divine Causation, Human Freedom and Moral Responsibility

Below is an excerpt addressing the subject of divine causation and compatibilism. This has been adapted from a series of responses I recently shared with some non-Calvinist Christians who have taken an incompatibilist position (i.e. their belief is that God's pre-determination of everything is incompatible with human freedom of choice and moral responsibility). I argue here for the opposite view, that God's sovereign pre-determination of everything is perfectly compatible with human freedom of choice and moral responsibility for our actions. This is excerpted from an ongoing conversation in the comments at the following blog post:
http://atheologyintension.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/2376/

Dear Non-Calvinist friends:

You present an interesting argument. The main thrust seems to be that Reformed theology makes God the author of evil, and in so doing removes man's freedom and moral responsibility. This objection is not new; it has been a common challenge faced by Calvinistic thinkers for centuries. I believe the argument is flawed, and I will explain why in detail. First, here is a summary:

1. The argument fails to distinguish between hyper Calvinism and mainstream Calvinism
2. The argument is based on a faulty understanding of mainstream Calvinism, which affirms compatibilism rather than mere determinism.
3. The argument is based on a faulty understanding of compatibilism, which affirms human freedom and responsibility in addition to determinism.
4. The argument groundlessly assumes compatibilism is impossible and self-contradictory.
5. The argument is based rationalism rather than a sound, Biblical epistemology (theory of knowledge)
6. The argument gives undue credit to the human mind's ability to peer into the unrevealed. 
7. The Argument fails to present a Biblically and logically sound alternative to the Reformed approach, which it rejects based on multiple misunderstandings.

Historically, Calvinists have taken a variety of positions, from a VERY SOFT compatibilism to a VERY HARD determinism. You have quoted from several examples of this diversity. A.W. Pink (depending on the day of the week), Vincent Cheung and Gordon Clark are in the line of the more hyper brand of Calvinists, who are most likely to espouse the hardest form of determinism without apology. You extol this as being somehow more “consistent.” Others like Piper, Packer and Frame are more likely to express a compatibilism that affirms human freedom as a mystery within (and even upheld by) divine ordination. I have read Calvin’s discussion of free will in the Institutes; he is a textbook compatibilist, at least in that part of his writings.

So I think it is a bit unfair for you to say Calvinistic ordination always “collapses into causal determinism” and then disparage the softening statements of compatibilism offered by the more moderate voices in the group. This would be akin to me saying that an Arminian view of free will collapses into Pelagianism (or perhaps Open Theism), while ignoring the Classical Arminian’s affirmation of Total Depravity (which strongly inhibits – or rather, kills –  libertarian freedom), and Prevenient Grace (which ackowledges the deadness and – gratefully – affirms our need for divine grace). I prefer to view the more moderate/mainstream Calvinists’ softening statements as evidence of a commitment to Biblical balance, preventing them from falling into the philosophical trap of hard determinism (the kind hypers veritably revel in). I do not see the softening statements as logical contradictions, but an attempt to be consistent with Scripture, grounded in the humility that confesses God’s ways are superior to our highest intellect.

I cannot see how God can be God without ordaining all things. I find this inconceivable simply because it is contrary to His Word:

• Proverbs 16:9 The heart of man plans his way, but the LORD establishes his steps.
• Proverbs 19:21 Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the LORD that will stand.
• Proverbs 20:24 A man’s steps are from the LORD; how then can man understand his way?
• Isaiah 46:8-11 “Remember this and stand firm, recall it to mind, you transgressors, remember the former things of old; for I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose,’ calling a bird of prey from the east, the man of my counsel from a far country. I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass; I have purposed, and I will do it.”
• Eph 1:11 In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will …

At the same time I cannot see man’s God-given freedom as less than a genuine, morally responsible and unconstrained liberty. Here I am just agreeing with Calvin and other compatibilists. We insist that God can ordain everything without denying his creatures real freedom. We cannot turn from either of these conscientiously held convictions.

Photo borrowed from
www.tominthebox.net

One of the great difficulties in this discussion is the fact that you and I are speaking two very different philosophical languages. We embrace opposing assumptions and presuppositions (although I would guess we fundamentally agree that Scripture is inerrant and Christ alone saves, by grace alone through faith alone to the glory of God alone).

Your arguments presuppose that freedom of will is incompatible with God's pre-determinate counsel. If I agreed with this presupposition, I would find your arguments unassailable. However, do you have any way to prove that this really is the case? Do you have a Biblical argument to prove this?

My presupposition is that God's all-determining will, eternal decree, and continuous providential action are not at all incompatible with creaturely freedom of will. I see God's decree clearly taught in Scripture, so I cannot take that away without a total change of heart in terms of the exegesis. On the other hand, I live in a world in which I experience every moment the liberty of my choices. Uncoerced, unconstrained, and apparently including the ability to choose otherwise than I do. But alas, which am I to believe? God's Holy Word or my undeniable experience?

But there is more. Another aspect of my experience has been my absolute and unquenchable rebellion. Only God's sovereign grace could ever have changed my heart and altered my course. And yet by His grace I did not find myself constrained or forced to believe. I chose freely; yet I could (and would) only choose to believe in Christ by sovereign, irresistible grace.

Then again, God's Word commands me to choose and holds me responsible for the choices I make. It nevertheless says I can have no good thing (faith and repentance included) unless God grants it to me by His mercy.

So now I have God's Word on both sides, and my experience on both sides. What can I do but hold on to both of them? I can't explain how God sovereignly ordains all things and yet keeps me free to choose in ways that render me morally responsible, unconstrained, voluntarily motivated, and apparently not without other options.

So I find myself embracing compatibilism, the belief that there can be a pre-determination of everything by an incomprehensible God without any diminishment of natural human freedom and responsibility. A million "rational" arguments against it won't change my understanding of God's Word or my experiences.

To be clear, when I say a million “rational” arguments won’t convince me otherwise, I am referring to arguments that are purely based on human logic, and thus appear to be “rational,” yet do not take Biblical revelation into sufficient account. I would like to think that all of my Arminian brothers will agree heartily with me on this point.

We are getting down to the root issue here. If I understand your position correctly, you fundamentally disagree with the premise of Christian compatibilism (i.e., that God’s pre-determination of everything is compatible with [and not contradictory to] genuine human freedom), and you do not even think it remotely possible that it could be true.

That last part presents a very strong claim of assurance in the way divine sovereignty and human choices can relate to one another. You are not simply saying they DO NOT relate a compatibilistic way; you seem to be making the claim that they CAN NOT relate this way. The alternative would seem to be a view of divine sovereignty that does not involve pre-determination of everything. I wonder how you distinguish between those events that are pre-determined and those that aren’t? Or is nothing at all pre-determined by God?

Don't fall for "Teeter Totter" theology!

To me, these matters are a great mystery. I view God's sovereign decree and my freedom as much more complex than a mere philosophical "seesaw," which would entail that any gain on one side necessarily results in a corresponding loss on the other. I conceive of my freedom as existing within and being upheld by His all-determining sovereignty.

I find it fascinating that any thinking person would not consider the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human choices to be a mystery. In saying this, I should be careful to define my terms. By “mystery,” I mean an item or area of knowledge which God has not revealed to us explicitly through some means (e.g., the Bible, creation, etc.).

I should also reiterate my definition of “compatibilism,” as mentioned above. It is simply the belief that divine pre-determination of everything does not conflict with genuine human freedom of choice. Jonathan Edwards affirmed this, but also went much further by actually proposing a theory of how it all works. I am not doing that (at least not right now). Although I admire Edwards’ attempt, I don’t view the results as something “revealed by God,” and thus I cannot claim the matter is no longer mysterious to me simply because someone has come up with what they think is a great explanation. Someone else may come up with a better one. Even so, until God reveals this, it remains an area of uncertainty for compatibilistic Christians who regard the Bible as their highest epistemological authority.

So I don't see how compatibilism can ever "collapse" into mere determinism. It involves determinism, yes, certainly. But if you define determinism in a way that automatically rules out the possibility of genuine freedom, I can only say that my compatibilism does not involve that kind of determinism. I would actually join you in arguing against any determinism that rules out human freedom and responsibility. I would equally oppose any version of human freedom that rules out determinism. I refuse to close off these categories as if they are mutually exclusive, since there does not appear to be any compelling reason to do so from a Biblical, philosophical or experiential standpoint.

Do you think it is remotely possible that predestination and freedom are not mutually exclusive?

I am honestly amazed that anyone can have so strong an assurance in ruling out the mere possibility (that God could possibly establish His sovereignty and our choices in a compatibilistic way) that they would even cast accusations of “irrationalism” at those who do affirm it.

By the way, I have never argued that it is virtuous to accept things that don’t make sense. My clearly stated position is that it is sensible for Christians to accept all the teaching of the Scriptures – the whole counsel of God – even if they find some aspects hard to understand or explain.

However, I would challenge anyone to Biblically and logically demonstrate that it is impossible for God to use compatibilism in His administration of the universe. In essence, can you show me how the concept of God’s pre-determination of everything and the concept of human freedom, when taken together, result in a genuine contradiction?

I am not asking whether these concepts strike you as contradictory, if they feel contradictory, if they appear to be contradictory, etc. (or even if you find the idea to be dangerous from a practical standpoint). I am only asking for Biblical and logical proof that they ARE contradictory.

The person who tries to do this faces a very significant problem: GOD is included in the equation! We are discussing a partly unrevealed relationship of metaphysical concepts which involves God’s management of His creation, the relationships of time and eternity, God and humanity (not to mention angels/demons and other entities we may not even know about), choice and freedom, responsibility and volition, etc.

My contention is that the best Biblical and logical sense we can make of the situation (taking all of the Biblical data and our own experiences into account) is to affirm that God mysteriously works (and remember, by “mysterious” I mean something He hasn’t explicitly revealed to us) in such a way that human freedom exists in harmony with divine pre-determination.

I also believe that one can make a much stronger Biblical argument for compatibilism than for incompatibilism. But that is part of the reason I am a compatibilist.

As an addendum, I share many of your concerns regarding the potential ill effects of an imbalanced Calvinism. Much of this can be characterized as hyper Calvinism (I sometimes refer to “high[per] Calvinism,” meaning anyone, whether “high” or “hyper” in his views, who over-emphasizes certain logical implications at the expense of other matters clearly revealed in Scripture). I am not saying all High Calvinists are hyper or imbalanced; but imbalanced Calvinists are almost always High or hyper in their theology.

This is part of the reason I have embraced Moderate Calvinism, and devoted myself to deterring and opposing any form of Calvinism which:

• denies or downplays human responsibility
• calls God the author or direct cause of evil
• uses God’s sovereignty as an excuse for sin
• hinders evangelism/missions on the basis of election or other theological considerations
• leads to apathy in service and devotion
• elevates human logic above the revealed will of God

To be honest, I would rather serve alongside a consecrated, moderate, and fair-minded Arminian who is growing in godliness than a cold high(per) Calvinist who is complacent and arrogant. 

In my view, Calvinism “done right” will actually result in the opposite effects, and to a greater extent than any non-Calvinist philosophy will. That is my conviction, and part of the reason I am a Moderate/Paradoxical Calvinist.

Again, thank you for your thoughtful comments and interactions.

Does God Ordain Everything that Occurs? Sure He Does!

Someone has recently posted a long list of quotations from various Calvinists (and one or two hypers) in order to "prove" that Calvinists believe God ordains all events, including evil ones. He also expresses his strong disapproval of this theology. The list of quotations, found here, is actually a great resource for Calvinists (assuming they can bear with the author's misleading comments, which are interspersed throughout).

Here is the response I posted:

Thank you for sharing this great collection of quotes and your thoughts on them. 

I can certainly understand not liking what you believe to be the unavoidable logical implications of Calvinistic theology. Fair enough. I hope you won’t mind my asking a few follow up questions. 

1. So, you deny that all events are ordained by God, correct? And your primary reason is that certain objectionable events have occurred, and you cannot conceive of a good God ordaining those events, correct? I want to be sure I am accurately understanding your position. 

2. Okay, assuming I have understood you correctly, what are the alternatives? 

• Does God ordain any events? Which ones?
• What are the primary differences between “ordained” and “non-ordained” events?
• Is God aware of “non-ordained” events before they occur? Or does He learn about them as they happen?
• Can anything outside of God (i.e., creation) exist without His initial creative action to “ordain” its existence? If not, how do we separate this initial “ordaining” action on God’s part from the creature’s subsequent actions, so as to say that God in no sense “caused” or “ordained” some of the creature’s actions? At what point do a creature’s actions begin to be “non-ordained”?
• What is the relationship between “ordained” and “non-ordained” events? Do some “ordained” events depend on “non-ordained” events (e.g., does the “ordained” event, forgiveness, depend on the “non-ordained” event, sin)? How does God “ordain” the good events without “ordaining” the evil ones that must occur in advance?
• Does God have the power and authority to prevent “non-ordained” events?
• If God foresees and allows an event, is He not in some sense “ordaining” its occurrence?
• Do “non-ordained” events happen in such a way that God cannot be said to maintain any control over them, i.e. to cause, allow, or prevent them?
• If these events cannot be caused, allowed, or prevented by God, what is His relationship to them? Does He have any authority or power over them?
• In what sense can any event occur outside of God’s ultimate oversight and authority? Does He maintain any sovereignty over these events, and in what sense? 

I don’t expect you to answer all of these questions. My intent is simply to show that it is easier to object to Reformed theology’s answers than it is to propose a well thought out and Biblically grounded alternative. 

Thanks again, and have great weekend. 

Blessings,
Derek Ashton

Anyone who thinks deeply about these matters will quickly run into paradoxes. Is there a better solution than a Biblically faithful, Calvinistic compatibilism?

PARADOX FILES, Vol. 19 - ESV Study Bible on Acts 13:48

The ESV Study Bible's note on Acts 13:48 says it perfectly:

Throughout Acts, Luke affirms the sovereignty of God over all of life while at the same time affirming the significance of human activity, as evidenced by the remarkable human effort and sacrifice involved in proclaiming the gospel. Thus Luke, without contradiction, maintains a dual emphasis on divine election ("appointed") and on human response ("believed") ... The emphasis here in 13:48 is on the way in which divine sovereignty (appointment) results in the belief of the Gentiles, demonstrating that their belief was due to God's grace alone.

That's good stuff. THEOparadox approved!

Big Shoes, Small Minds (or "Sovereignty and Freedom in Perspective")

So ... I believe that God, who created the world and everything else that exists, exercises absolute, meticulous and exhaustive sovereignty over all events, including every thought, word and deed of mankind, through His definite predestination and continual providence. I also happen to believe that human beings make real, significant, voluntary and uncoerced choices for which they are morally responsible in a just economy.


This is not "hard" determinism or "soft" determinism, but FREE DETERMINISM.

Does this compatibilistic belief in FREE DETERMINISM strike you, upon reflection, as contradictory, irrational or illogical? Then I suggest you read the fifth word in the first sentence again. In case you have forgotten, we are speaking about GOD. My friend, have you come to to terms with the fact that the self-existent, eternal God created the world and everything else from exactly nothing? If you think it is impossible for Him to give His creatures genuine freedom without relinquishing His meticulous sovereignty, you may have never imagined a God big enough to wear His own shoes. You may be trying to fit Him into a small space that can't hold Him. That small space is the sum of what you consider logically conceivable. If God must fit into this space, then your mind's capacity, rather than His omnipotent ability, has become the measure of Truth. Yet Truth was there before your mind came into being; and Truth contains your mind within it, not the other way around.

While our minds can hold the knowledge of His greatness, they cannot hold His greatness. This is an important fact to remember when we feel we must tell God what He can and can't do. Indeed, you may not happen to believe that God employs FREE DETERMINISM in His administration of the universe. But if you don't think it is possible for Him to do so, it is possible that you may not actually believe in the Biblical God at all.

And if you go to the Bible with an open heart to find out how God actually administers His universe, you will find FREE DETERMINISM is the only real possibility.

An Irenic Discussion of Arminianism and (Moderate) Calvinism

For the last week, I have been enjoying a healthy and deeply interesting dialogue about Calvinism and Arminianism with Dr. Roger Olson on his blog site. This has been an occasional but ongoing conversation since he first started blogging back in July of 2010. Although we are poles apart on a number of theological issues, Dr. Olson has been gracious in his dealings with me as an "opponent." I am including our back and forth comments below for the benefit of curious folks who want to know whether this can even be done . . . and for contentious folks who don't think it can be done. I am also posting this because it contains defenses of key Moderate Calvinist stances regarding theological paradox, compatibilism, the extent of the atonement, God's decrees, and other matters.

As followers (and representatives) of Christ, we must be unified in our love for one another, even if we are not unified on every point of doctrine. It's more important for Calvinists and Arminians to love one another than to "defeat" one another.

See it all here: http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2012/12/calvinism-and-the-god-as-author-analogy/#comments

1. 
   
2. Derek Ashton says:
   December 29, 2012 at 7:30 pm
   Dr. Olson,

   Interesting topic here! Speaking for myself as a more-or-less Piper-esque Calvinist (and not implying that he would claim my views), I want to address the line of reasoning some previous commenters have chosen. Specifically, I would like to address the idea of taking certain tenets of Calvinism to their “logical conclusion.”

   It is worth noting that the Desiring God article linked in your post is a good bit more in-depth and honest about the tensions than many of your readers may realize. I would also suppose that Calvinists in general have much more sophisticated views than the “determinism taken to its logical conclusion” approach which seems to be a “straw man of choice” in this thread. In itself, the term compatibilism implies that “determinism taken to its logical conclusion” is insufficient to describe the viewpoint to which compatibilistic Calvinists adhere. In fact, the term contains an implicit denial of “determinism taken to its logical conclusion.”

   Compatibilism certainly involves some mystery and tension. But let’s be honest–all Christians embrace logical tensions to some degree. Take the statement, “Jesus is God” to its “logical conclusion” and we have grounds to deny essentials like the virgin birth, the humanity of Christ, the death of Christ (and therefore the resurrection), etc. because God can’t “logically” be born, be a creature, die, etc. Take “Jesus is a human being” to its “logical conclusion” and we have grounds to deny His deity, eternality, etc. Such reasoning is obviously not valid (at least not for Christians), yet I see no difference between this and the kind of reasoning contained in some of the comments above (note that I am not saying anyone here is not a Christian; only that the reasoning employed is invalid for Christians). Many core doctrines of the Christian faith contain this kind of tension, and it would not be proper to take one facet of the doctrine to its “logical conclusion” without overlaying and nuancing through appeals to other aspects of the doctrine. Let’s not sugar coat this, or pretend that every aspect of every Christian doctrine can properly be “taken to its logical conclusion.”

   One could ostensibly take selected portions of the ancient creeds and use them to argue against the truths contained in other portions of the same creeds. Even Arius would have agreed with parts of the Nicene creed; then, by taking them to their “logical conclusion,” he would have argued against the other parts. Arius took portions of the Biblical teaching to their “logical conclusion” without embracing other portions because, in his mind, it would not logically make sense to do so. Is there not a danger in this kind of reasoning, which seems to make human understanding, rather than God’s Word, the ultimate measure of the Truth. Arius was, after all, a genuine heretic on both Calvinist and Arminian terms.

   What I appreciate in the writings of compatibilistic Calvinists like Piper is a willingness to honestly accept all of the Biblical data, even when it goes beyond the ability of the human mind to reconcile all of the ensuing tension. While I admire the rigorous commitment to logic on the part of many Arminians, I have yet to find one that (to my satisfaction, at least) admits all of the Biblical testimony into the system. For me, losing precious Biblical propositions is worse than having inexplicable holes in the system. And with that said, I am a Calvinist today because I do not find a more logically consistent system that takes in all of the Biblical data. I easily find more logically consistent systems that don’t take it in. For me, it’s Sola Scriptura first, and then the fun part of working out the logic as far as possible.

   Note: I am not saying Arminians don’t believe the Bible; I am saying their system, especially as represented in this thread, seems to inconsistently elevate human logic in opposition to the Calvinistic doctrine of Providence while readily accepting the logical tensions of the Incarnation and other orthodox doctrines. No Arminian says of the humanity of Christ: “Whatever the Bible means in those passages, it can’t mean that!”

   Finally, to answer your questions in the post, I would take the position that evil does not become good simply because God ordains it. It would never become a ground for rejoicing simply because God ordained it. Our sadness at the atrocities in this world may in fact reflect God’s own heart and mind in the matter. However, along with Him, we rejoice exuberantly in all of the good that He ultimately brings about through the evil that is done. Per Romasn 8:28.

   To illustrate this in a more personal way: by God’s grace, I hate and abhor my own sins. I am deeply saddened and shamed by them. Yet I also rejoice in the forgiveness and grace that I could never have experienced if I was sinless. I don’t love being a sinner; but I love being redeemed from sin! Yet I couldn’t have been redeemed if I had never been a sinner. Thus, as a forgiven perpetrator of heinous crimes against a holy God and His creatures, my Calvinistic theology lines up perfectly with my experience and what I find in the Scriptures. If anything, a true Calvinist will ask God for MORE feelings of moral repugnance against evil. And at the same time he will ask for more JOY in God’s good grace as well. All of this lies right at the heart of Jesus’ teaching: “Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Apparently He believes in paradoxes, too.

   A happy New Year to all, and much joy in Christ!

   Derek Ashton
   Reply
   • rogereolson says:
     December 30, 2012 at 1:36 pm
     Derek, I always appreciate your civility even when we sharply disagree. You will not be surprised to read me say that, in my opinion, it is Calvinism that seeks logical consistency over biblical fidelity. I will point this time to only one example: limited atonement (which I realize some Calvinists reject but which seem to be part and parcel of what you call eloquently “Piper-esque” Calvinism). As I have explained in Against Calvinism, the high Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement must ignore much Scripture. Of course, I think you would agree, neither side in this debate really “ignores” any Scripture. What we are calling ignoring is really interpreting in a non-natural sense. I hope you will agree that no intelligent Arminian literally “ignores” any of Scripture. What we do is interpret Scripture differently (than Calvinists). So, to be fair, I don’t believe any informed, intelligent Calvinist literally ignores any of Scripture. What happens, in my opinion, is that much of Scripture is interpreted in non-natural ways in order to make it fit with the system. I’m sure you would admit that’s what you really mean when you say non-Calvinist systems of theology overlook or ignore crucial passages of Scripture. In my opinion, limited atonement does exactly what Piper argues we must NOT do in his long footnote about Clark Pinnock in (I think) Desiring God. He argues that Pinnock believes some things because Scripture allows it and logic requires it. I can’t believe any Christian does otherwise. We all believe some things because logic (or evidence) requires it and Scripture allows it. That’s how I view limited atonement. I don’t say Calvinists who believe in it ignore or overlook Scripture; I say they take something they believe (e.g., unconditional election of some sinners and irresistible grace granted to them only) and force it to its logical conclusion (limited atonement) and then interpret Scriptures no non-Calvinist would interpret this way as supporting limited atonement. As for your explanation of your feelings about evils God ordains I will just say I can’t even imagine living with that level of cognitive dissonance. If I came to believe that God ordained and rendered certain an event such that he manipulated the thoughts and motives that sinfully caused it I would have to celebrate all of that and not isolate the good results and celebrate only them. That seems absurd to me. I realize it doesn’t to you. However, I thank you for joining the discussion. Your Calvinist voice is always most welcome here because you are not insulting or uncivil. I wonder if you would answer this question I have put to many Calvinists without satisfactory answers? From where did the first evil inclination come?
     Reply
     • Derek Ashton says:
       December 31, 2012 at 4:36 am
       Dr. Olson,

       Thank you for your very kind words.

       I actually agree with what you mentioned concerning non-natural exegesis used in support of limited atonement. My views on that topic are more in line with Richard Baxter (and many other puritans, including numerous Westminster divines), R.L. Dabney, William G.T. Shedd, Bruce Ware, and (I suppose) John Calvin. I am drawn to the moderate historical stream within Calvinism whose adherents are apt to take texts such as I John 2:2 at face value. I disagree at least partly with Piper’s approach on this.

       There are admittedly those on both sides of the Calvinist/Arminian spectrum who engage in system-driven exegesis (and some on both sides who tend not to, thankfully). One of the arguments I have made to fellow Calvinists is that they should take a more moderate view on limited atonement simply because it fits more consistently with God’s universal love/saving desire for all people (which is strongly affirmed by Piper) and the free offer of the Gospel (also strongly affirmed by Piper). These mainstream Calvinist essentials, which unfortunately aren’t conveyed well by the TULIP acronym, logically argue for a less limited atonement than most of today’s vocal Calvinists are promoting.

       Concerning the doctrine of Providence, I don’t think a Reformed view requires that God “manipulates the thoughts and motives” behind sinful actions. All mainstream Calvinists retain, at the very least, the concept of “unconstrained” and “voluntary” creaturely actions (thus no one is “manipulated” under normal conditions). This is one of the critical distinctions entailed in compatibilism. Of course, I understand that this quibble probably doesn’t make the Reformed approach any more attractive for committed Arminians.

       Your question about the first evil inclination certainly provokes thought. My Biblicist side wants to say Scripture leaves this entirely in the realm of mystery. And that is probably the best place for me to leave it, as much as I would like to speculate. Do you see Open Theism, Arminianism, Molinism or any other non-Calvinist system answering this in a more satisfying way?

       You probably know that Augustine danced around with this question in the Enchiridion, chapters 10-23. His answers are paradoxical: God only created good; evil is a corruption/privation of that good; thus evil cannot exist apart from good, while good can exist apart from evil; anything totally evil would cease to exist because in it there would be no good thing left to corrupt with evil; thus a being cannot be evil without also being good in some sense.

       Augustine’s answer is sensible enough, but still leaves your question unanswered. What prompted the initial privation of good? I suppose only God truly knows.

       Blessings,
       Derek
       Reply
       • rogereolson says:
         December 31, 2012 at 10:11 pm
         Derek, I always appreciate your irenicism (which doesn’t in any way dilute your strongly held theology). The problem I have with any Calvinist appealing to mystery when faced with the question of the source of the first evil inclination is the typical Calvinist doctrine of providence which, according to my understanding of it, anyway, excludes anything real (and even evil, though a privation of the good only, is real in that it exists) from escaping God’s ordination. Surely, if God is as all-determining and controlling as most Calvinist theologians assert (e.g., Helm and Sproul), then nothing, not even the first evil inclination, can fall outside God’s plan and determination. The way most Calvinists have handled this (including Edwards) is to say that God brought it about by withholding the grace needed for the creature not to develop an evil inclination. Edwards admits that this amounts to making God the author of sin and evil in a restricted sense. God, he argues, is not the cause of them, but, like everything else, they only exist because God desires them to and renders them certain. (I have expounded this and documented it in Against Calvinism.) It seems to me a key difference between Calvinism and Arminianism (and this difference existed also between, say, Luther and the Anabaptists) is that one side sees evil as having purpose above, higher than the purpose of the creature (e.g., selfishness). It has divine purpose, ultimate purpose. The other side regards evil as a surd, lacking any purpose at all. God can bring good out of it, but it has no divine purpose behind it. God never intended for it to come into existence. The problem with the first view, it seems to me, is that, from an ultimate perspective, evil is not really evil. Anyway, that is how I would have to regard it did I hold that view.
         Reply
         • Derek Ashton says:
           January 2, 2013 at 10:17 am
           Dr. Olson,

           I see your point, and this is truly an important difference, as you noted. On Calvinistic terms, no event (including the first evil) can ever be viewed as non-ordained or unforeseen by God. He could not have been “surprised” when the first evil occurred.

           However, does the classical Arminian approach really view evil as entirely purposeless? It would seem that God’s omniscience entails an awareness on His part of every evil that ever will or can occur, and His omnipotence would include the ability to prevent or allow it. If this is so, then He must maintain ultimate control over evil (and therefore have some kind of purpose in allowing it). If not, He could choose not to allow it.

           Blessings,
           Derek
         • rogereolson says:
           January 2, 2013 at 2:05 pm
           Purposeless in terms of intentionality. Of course God had a purpose in allowing it. The difference lies in intentionality. In Calvinism, as I understand it (having read scores of books by Calvinists including Calvin himself), every event is foreordained and rendered certain by God for a specific purpose. God intends it to happen, not just to permit it to happen (Calvin rejected the language of permission in discussing divine providence). In Arminian theology we distinquish between two wills of God: antecedent (in which evil does not exist at all) and consequent (in which God permits evil in order not to control creatures so that they can only do what he intends for them to do). Thus, in Arminian theology, evil has no purpose in God’s overall plan. It happens. God deals with it, overcoming it and, when possible, bringing good out of it.
         • Derek Ashton says:
           January 3, 2013 at 2:17 am
           Dr. Olson,

           Thank you for explaining this in further detail; those are useful distinctions. Does this approach make the cross “plan B” rather than God’s original design?

           Much has been made of Calvin’s critique of divine “permission,” but he makes it clear that what he opposes is a “bare permission” by which God would relinquish His Lordship and Providence, and merely respond to human wills rather than rule over them.

           I really appreciate your taking time to discuss these matters with me. At the end of the day, we are fellow Christians. That is what counts!

           Blessings,
           Derek
         • rogereolson says:
           January 3, 2013 at 3:10 pm
           Thanks, Derek. I always enjoy having dialogue with you. But, as I’m sure you have noticed, we tend to go around in circles–always returning to the same questions and answers and differences. I wonder to what extent our basic differences (also between most evangelical Calvinists and evangelical Arminians) are a matter of perspective? I’m not relativizing the matter because I do believe one of us is right and the other wrong (or we’re both wrong). But I’m continually puzzled by how equally sincere, God-fearing, Bible-believing, Jesus-loving, reasonable people can see God’s sovereignty in Scripture so differently? To answer your question. I don’t think of the cross as “Plan B” in the ordinary sense because, as a classical Arminian (not an open theist) I think God knew all along what was going to happen. I do think the cross is part of God’s consequent will, not God’s antecedent will. But just in case you have difficulty with that, think about the fact that ONLY (not shouting, just emphasizing) a supralapsarian can really say that the cross is God’s “Plan A,” part of God’s antecedent will. An infralapsarian (most Calvinists) will also have the same challenge (from a supralapsarian) as you give me. I once asked John Piper about this, hoping to trap him (we were having a very irenic, civil discussion but he was trying to trap me, too–into affirming open theism) and he said he “might be” a supralapsarian. He indicated he was leaning in that direction. I think that would be the way anyone would have to go if they affirm that the cross is “Plan A” in the sense of logically preceding God’s decree to permit the fall. What do you think? Can an infralapsarian say that the cross is God’s “Plan A” in the sense you mean–”God’s original design?”
       • Derek Ashton says:
         January 5, 2013 at 10:02 pm
         Dr. Olson,

         Yes, I have noticed that our discussions (and most between Calvinists and Arminians) seem to always take the same turns. It is easy to get frustrated with this and start pressing harder (or louder) in an effort to get things resolved. But I doubt it is necessary to get past the differences; perhaps just understand them better. That is what I most appreciate about our dialogues. You have been involved in this discussion with many different Calvinists and for a good while, so your restraint in this regard is very much appreciated. It says much about your character.

         Regarding your question, I believe the cross was/is “Plan A,” but not because of supralapsarian leanings. Some infralapsarians would take all of the decrees together and call that, collectively, “Plan A.” From this standpoint, every Calvinist can (and should) view the cross as “Plan A” or God’s original design. This is perhaps similar to your approach in the comment above, which seems to take God’s antecedent and consequent will(s) together as “Plan A.” The move seems warranted in both cases, and perhaps points to an important similarity between the two schools of thought when backed into the same corner!

         As a side note, I like the approach taken by R.L. Dabney, who said the following (so much better than I can say it):

         “… he who apprehends the action of the infinite mind reasonably and scripturally at once, sees that, while the sublapsarian is right in his spirit and aim, both parties are wrong in their method, and the issue is one which should never have been raised. As God’s thought and will do not exist in his consciousness in parts, so they involve no sequence, neither the one nor the other. The decree which determines so vast a multitude of parts is itself a unit. The whole all-comprehending thought is one coëtaneous intuition; the whole decree one act of will. But in virtue of the very consistency and accuracy of the divine plan, and infinity of the divine knowledge, facts destined to emerge out of one part of the plan, being present in thought to God, enter into logical relation to other parts of the same plan. As the plan is God’s thought, no part precedes any other. But none the less those parts which are destined to be, in execution, prior and posterior, stand in their just causal relations in his thinking. One result decreed is to depend on another result decreed. But as the decree is God’s consciousness, all is equally primary. Thus there will be neither supra- nor infra-lapsarian, and no room for their debate.” (This is from Dabney’s essay entitled, God’s Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy, as Related to His Power, Wisdom and Sincerity)

         While slightly more sympathetic to the infralapsarian position, Dabney stands with a number of other Calvinists in the moderate stream who disparaged the lapsarian debates in general. In their view, the whole project goes well beyond the bounds of Scripture and involves us in questions that are ultimately unanswerable (or at least defy systematization). Herman Bavinck was another notable representative of this viewpoint.

         So it would appear that we can both agree that the cross is viewed as God’s original design from each of our perspectives. Now, please don’t take the following as an attempt to “trap” you (and I doubt I could successfully trap you, anyhow) . . . but does this put you in the position affirming that evil, in general, was also part of “Plan A,” or God’s original design? And would this not make evil “intentional” and “purposeful” from the divine perspective, even if taken as God’s consequent will? Finally, does this potentially put us in the same boat as far as theodicy is concerned? Maybe the differences can be illustrated more succinctly in this attempted summation:

         ***The Calvinist says God (in His secret, sovereign will) deliberately decrees to permit evil (for a purpose), and every evil is used for the greater good.
         ***The Arminian says God (in His consequent will) knowledgeably chooses to permit evil (for a purpose?), and some evils are used for the greater good.

         Both are taking measures to maintain that God is not directly “responsible” or “culpable” for the evil that occurs. Yet both view evil as God’s “will” in some sense. However, if my summations above are correct, Calvinism more satisfactorily vindicates God’s permission of evil by putting every evil to good use. For Calvinists, this is part of what is meant by “works all things together for good” in Romans 8:28.

         Blessings,
         Derek
         Reply

Three Good Reads in Reformed Theology

I've been enjoying these and finding them very beneficial.

#1 The first "good read" is this group of extended quotations from some leading theologians regarding the secret and revealed will of God. This is direct source material, so you can get it from the proverbial horse's mouth. I like this bit from Calvin:

"In fine, give up all fondness for your puerile dilemma, for the Scriptures assure me of the secret will of God; asserting what I have learned from them I do speak of an ascertained truth; but because I do not reach so great a height, I reverently adore with fear and trembling what is too sublime for the angels themselves. Often therefore in my writings I admonish my readers, that on this subject nothing is better than a learned ignorance; for those rave like madmen who arrogate to know more about it than is fit."

And this one from Jonathan Edwards caught my attention:

"... all that own the being of a God own that he knows all things beforehand. Now, it is self-evident, that if he knows all things beforehand, he either doth approve of them, or he doth not approve of them; that is, he either is willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that they should be, is to decree them."

Apparently Edwards never met an open theist! God alone knows if Edwards will ever meet one in the future (think about it).

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#2 A second "good read" is Paul Manata's Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - A Contemporary Introduction. Lots of deep philosophical stuff here. Manata has a gift, and I am grateful that he uses it to advance good theology! He argues that Reformed Theology is, by definition, both deterministic and compatibilistic, and decidedly unaffirming of libertarian free will. It's all worth reading and considering, and well documented, too.

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#3  The third "good read" is David Ponter's response to James Anderson's attempt to reconcile the Free Offer of the Gospel with a provisionally Limited Atonement using Newcomb's Paradox (see here and here). It's a deeply complicated argument, but worth thinking about. To me, this is a little bit like Gandalf vs. Saruman (I won't say which one is which). Although James Anderson is a personal hero for expounding so brilliantly on theological paradox, in this case I concur with Ponter (also a personal hero for expounding brilliantly on historic Moderate Calvinism) in his closing remarks:

"Anderson wants to argue that if a moderate Calvinist insists that limited atonement precludes a sincere offer, he must accept that election likewise precludes a sincere offer, for the same reasons. However, a proper rebuttal rejects the assumed univocal relationship between limited atonement and election in relation to the sincere offer, such that one can counter that limited atonement is incompatible with the free offer, while election is not. The only avenue Anderson can have, as I see it, is to attempt to claim that we should see election as equally incompatible with a sincere offer (given our assumptions?). But on what grounds could he suggest that? and does he really want to argue that in the first place? Perhaps Anderson might say both election and limited atonement bare a paradoxical relationship to the sincere offer. My reply would be limited atonement and the sincere free offer entail a contradiction (you cannot offer what you are not able to give), while election and the free offer entail a paradox (one offers, by revealed will, what one does not intend to give, by secret will). We would say we are warranted in rejecting the contradiction, while retaining the paradox. Anderson could only claim that one can indeed sincerely offer what one is not able to give."

The issues in these three "good reads" are tied together, and each of them has bearing on both hyper Calvinism and Arminianism (mind you, I'm not saying any of the people mentioned in this post are hyper Calvinists - far from it - only that the issues covered have direct bearing on refuting that error). To be balanced, I believe we must hold to the paradox of God's revealed and secret wills which are united perfectly in the glorious mystery of His eternal wisdom; we must hold to the paradox of compatibilism so that man is responsible for his actions under the total sovereignty of God; and we must hold to the Free Offer of the Gospel backed up by an infinitely powerful atonement, which, paradoxically, is not intended to save all people. Thank God it saves some!