Answering Leighton Flowers on Libertarian Freedom and Compatibilism

In his podcasts, stalwart anti-Calvinist Leighton Flowers is fond of defining "Libertarian Free Will" (LFW) as "the ability to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

In at least one of his blog posts, he has defined the term a little further, as follows:

LFW = "The categorical ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action." 

(See here: https://soteriology101.wordpress.com/2017/07/01/sinaholics-a-debate-over-inability/)

First, let's define the added term, "categorical." According to the Oxford Dictionary, this word means "unambiguously explicit and direct." (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/categorical)

So, updating Dr. Flowers' working definition with this meaning, we have:

LFW = "The unambiguously explicit and direct ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

No real significance is added with the inclusion of "categorical;" it simply renders the statement slightly more emphatic. As far as the addition of "the will" to this working definition, this also does not seem to add anything of substance. By definition, choosing and deciding are activities in which the will is active. Whether we phrase this as "refrain or not refrain from," or, as I would prefer, "engage or not engage in," a given moral action--this is nothing more than a description of the will's basic function. A person without a will could do nothing of a moral nature.

This definition of LFW summarizes the position Dr. Flowers affirms in opposition to what he thinks Calvinists believe. Nevertheless, I wonder how many well-informed Calvinists would actually dispute the fact that this ability exists?

As a Calvinist and theological compatibilist, I really have no problem accepting Dr. Flowers' definition as a valid description of "will" (or even "free will") and affirming that human beings possess it. Every rational person should find this to be intuitive and self-evident. Of course human beings have this ability. At the same time, my compatibilism affirms that all of the "free choices" of human beings are foreknown and foreordained by a wise and good God. One might ask, "How can this be?" 

From the perspective of compatibilism, we can line up the propositions this way:

P1 Human beings possess the ability to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P2 God has ordained which moral actions each human being will choose to refrain from, and which moral actions each human being will choose not to refrain from.

P3 Human beings exercise their "free will" in choosing to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P4 God exercises His sovereignty in determining how, when, where, and why man's "free will" shall be exercised. 

These are the rudimentary claims of theological compatibilism, which in itself is a very simple concept. From this standpoint, I would affirm Dr. Flowers' definition of LFW within my own understanding of compatibilism, and would find no contradiction. In what it affirms, his claim is true and just needs more added to it. His definition adequately describes man's part; however, God's part is neglected.

Of course, much more rigorous philosophical definitions of LFW have been put forth, and they typically entail a denial of the possibility that specified moral actions are pre-determined in any way. We should oppose that type of LFW as an outright denial of Biblical truth. At least at the level of defining terms, Leighton Flowers does not seem to hold to that type of LFW. And that is commendable, for it leaves the door open to a Biblical compatibilism.

On the other hand, if Dr. Flowers were to put forth a definition like the following, we would have to reject it:

LFW = "the willingness of the will to choose what is good (as God defines it), apart from grace."

What is the difference? If we are only talking about "ability," that is one thing. God gives all of us abilities that we do not exercise. I always have the "ability" to steal food from the grocery store; however, by the grace of God I have so far never had the "will" to do it. I also have the "ability" to purchase and smoke cigarettes. And, fortunately, I have never had the "will" to do that, either. I also have the ability to purchase food and give it to homeless people. By God's grace that has actually happened once or twice. The operative phrase here is "by God's grace."

Sadly, there are also morally reprehensible actions I have had the will to do from time to time, and I did not refrain from doing them. And it is just the same with you, my friend. We are all sinners who have had our wills set in opposition to God and have done a variety of evil things. I thank God that by His mercy I have not done even more evil. If not for His mercy, I surely would have. That I recognize my evils as evil, and that He gives me the willingness to repent and pursue the good, is an incredible mercy. But this is not from any purportedly natural "free will," it is from grace alone!

As a compatibilist, I affirm that my every inclination toward good is graciously given from God. Such willingness would not have sprung up out of my own heart, if grace had not been given to direct me toward the good and the right. If not for grace, I certainly would have refrained from every good act and would have only pursued evil.

As a compatibilist, I affirm that every inclination I have toward evil comes solely from me. I own it and I am fully responsible for it, even if God also foreordained which actions I will choose. His foreordination does not change the fact that it is my own will and I am responsible. I was the one who chose to refrain or not refrain. It wasn't as if I tried to do good and He instead directed me toward evil, saying "I would rather you do this evil thing." And it is not as though He made me do it, in any sense. Foreordination is not that. God forbid that such an unworthy thought should ever be embraced.

Ever since the fall, man's will and very nature have been bent toward evil, and this can only change through God's grace. By nature, apart from grace, fallen man, having the ability to choose between good and evil, will always choose evil. The problem is not rooted in "ability;" it is rooted in "will." Fallen man is "totally unable" to do good only because he is "totally unwilling." Thankfully, common grace results in a measure of good that is accomplished even through the unregenerate. Saving grace results in the introduction of a new, regenerated nature within the believer. A nature that truly longs for what is good. And so, by God's grace, there is much good in the world. We should glorify Him perpetually and magnificently for this!

A Biblical perspective would never credit the choice for good to our own mere ability or willingness (this would be self-deception and vainglory); nor would it ever blame God for our own choices of evil (that would be blasphemous and ignorant).

Biblical thinking can only give God all the glory for all of the good that occurs. And we can only accept full responsibility for our own choices and actions. With this perspective, the believer is driven to keep repenting of his own evil and to continually ask God for more grace so that he can grow and do more good to the glory of God.

As Paul states:

I Cor. 15:10  But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God that is with me.

With Dr. Flowers' perspective, one wonders how the believer may ever know that he is experiencing grace, since it all seems to boil down to the exercise of one's own natural ability to "refrain or not refrain" from this or that moral action. When does a person come face to face with the realities of his own corrupt will, and how sharply that will is bent toward evil? Or with the need for God to rescue us from that will, lest we perish? 

If my salvation or sanctification depended on my own ability and willingness to "refrain" from what is evil and "not refrain" from what is good, I suspect that there would be no hope at all for me. 

Romans 7:24-25a  Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!

May those who downplay the need for grace in these matters find themselves desperately longing for the only Redeemer who can rescue us from the results of our own ability and will.

Anselm on Man's Inexcusable Inability

Anselm (1033-1109) has been dubbed "the second Augustine." The excerpt below is from his famous work, Cur Deus Homo (Latin for Why the God-Man?), which discusses the incarnation and atonement of Christ. You may read the entire work here. Throughout the book, Anselm converses with "Boso." I am not sure if "Boso" was a real person or just a literary device intended to give the book a more conversational tone.

CHAPTER XXIV.How, as long as man does not restore what he owes God, he cannot be happy, nor is he excused by want of power.
Anselm.. If a man is called unjust who does not pay his fellow-man a debt, much more is he unjust who does not restore what he owes God.
Boso. If he can pay and yet does not, he is certainly unjust. But if he be not able, wherein is he unjust?
Anselm.. Indeed, if the origin of his inability were not in himself, there might be some excuse for him. But if in this very impotence lies the fault, as it does not lessen the sin, neither does it excuse him from paying what is due. Suppose one should assign his slave a certain piece of work, and should command him not to throw himself into a ditch, which he points out to him and from which he could not extricate himself; and suppose that the slave, despising his master's command and warning, throws himself into the ditch before pointed out, so as to be utterly unable to accomplish the work assigned; think you that his inability will at all excuse him for not doing his appointed work?
Boso. By no means, but will rather increase his crime, since he brought his inability upon himself. For doubly has he sinned, in not doing what he was commanded to do and in doing what he was forewarned not to do.
Anselm.. Just so inexcusable is man, who has voluntarily brought upon himself a debt which he cannot pay, and by his own fault disabled himself, so that he can neither escape his previous obligation not to sin, nor pay the debt which be has incurred by sin. For his very inability is guilt, because he ought not to have it; nay, he ought to be free from it; for as it is a crime not to have what he ought, it is also a crime to have what he ought not. Therefore, as it is a crime in man not to have that power which he received to avoid sin, it is also a crime to have that inability by which he can neither do right and avoid sin, nor restore the debt which he owes on account of his sin. For it is by his own free action that he loses that power, and falls into this inability. For not to have the power which one ought to have, is the same thing as to have the inability which one ought not to have. Therefore man's inability to restore what he owes to God, an inability brought upon himself for that very purpose, does not excuse man from paying; for the result of sin cannot excuse the sin itself.

(Underlining has been added for emphasis) 

Is There a Viable Non-Calvinist Interpretation for this?

Try as I might, I can't see any way to explain the following passage apart from Unconditional Election and the Effectual Call. No Arminian or Open Theist interpretation seems possible, let alone plausible. Maybe I've just been a Calvinist for too long, and have forgotten how to think the other way.

I Corinthians 1:26-31 For consider your calling, brothers: not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being might boast in the presence of God. And because of him you are in Christ Jesus, who became to us wisdom from God, righteousness and sanctification and redemption, so that, as it is written, “Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord.”

What does Paul mean by "calling", if not the divinely orchestrated Effectual Call? How does one explain, "God chose A [to have a particular effect upon] B", apart from Unconditional Election? What does Paul mean by, "because of Him you are in Christ Jesus", if not the monergistic action of God in saving His elect? And what prevents me from boasting, if salvation ultimately depends more on my own "free choice" than on God's?

John Wesley himself seems to have temporarily become a Calvinist in his notes on the passage:

I Cor. 1:26 Behold your calling - What manner of men they are whom God calls. That not many wise men after the flesh - In the account of the world. Not many mighty - Men of power and authority.

Wesley can't possibly mean the general call of the Gospel is kept from those who are wise and mighty after the flesh, can he? Does he believe in a special call? Based on these notes, he seems to.

I Cor. 1:27 [No entry exists in John Wesley's Notes for this verse]

Shocking!

I Cor. 1:28 Things that are not - The Jews frequently called the gentiles, "Them that are not," 2 Esdras vi. 56, 57. In so supreme contempt did they hold them. The things that are - In high esteem.

That's an interesting detail. Wesley is worth reading.

I Cor. 1:29 That no flesh - A fit appellation. Flesh is fair, but withering as grass. May glory before God - In God we ought to glory. 

Another good thought. I have nothing against Wesley, just his errors.

I Cor. 1:30 Of him - Out of his free grace and mercy. Are ye Engrafted into Christ Jesus, who is made unto us that believe wisdom, who were before utterly foolish and ignorant. Righteousness - The sole ground of our justification, who were before under the wrath and curse of God. Sanctification - A principle of universal holiness, whereas before we were altogether dead in sin. And redemption - That is, complete deliverance from all evil, and eternal bliss both of soul and body. 

Is God "free" to bestow His grace and engraft us into Christ when, where, and how He Himself wills? Does Wesley affirm man's total moral inability when he says we were "altogether dead in sin"?

I Cor. 1:31 Let him glory in the Lord - Not in himself, not in the flesh, not in the world. Jeremiah 9:23-24

Is there an Arminian, Open Theist, or other advocate of "free will" out there who can provide a more satisfying explanation for his passage? One that is faithful to Sola Scripture and the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy?

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 15

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

4) The paradox model emphasizes faithfulness in biblical study 

 The great lesson in exegesis and theological formulation is that faithfulness to the text has 

precedence over logical coherence.42

 This does not stifle debate as if anyone may shout “paradox” and dogmatically end discussion. No, debate must continue by faithful study with the caution that though we must engage with critical thinking, we must not make logical consistency the dominant principle or ultimate goal.  

 For example, if Scripture clearly teaches that the natural man has moral inability and if it clearly teaches that he has full responsibility then, however difficult this may be to harmonize logically, we must accept both and work hard to apply both in preaching, teaching, and living. Similarly, if Scripture perspicuously teaches that the natural man is morally unable to do anything good then this teaching ought to take precedence over logical inferences “from Scripture” that contradict that teaching,43 such as the duty/ability inference.  

 Of course, how we interpret the many passages on inability (blindness, deafness, deadness, etc.44) must reflect faithful exegesis.45

 Debate is also legitimate with regard to the “duty implies ability” reasoning to see if it is philosophically problematic, Kantian, and counterintuitive.46

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

42 In one sense, admitting paradox is simply another way of saying that God's thoughts are above ours as the heavens are above the earth and it should not surprise us when we face difficulty. What we must do in faithful quest of the truth is pull together biblical data and accept paradox "where it is warranted."(John Frame, Ibid, 323-24). Logic is properly used when it is governed by the recognition of our creaturehood and hence by the recognition of the limits of creaturely reasoning. We must acknowledge the distinction between Creator and creature, and thinking this way must control the use of logic because the laws of logic are founded in the character of God (He is truth and thus there can be no contradiction in His knowledge or revelation). Properly used, the laws of logic will reveal no contradiction in the biblical system of truth because as God's revelation it has no real contradiction.  

43In this light, the inference that people (believers and non-believers alike) draw from duty to ability wrongly sets aside the biblical teaching about moral inability. The command to keep the whole law of God in its spirit and intent is a duty; from that we must not set aside the doctrine that an evil tree cannot bear good fruit. In turn, the fact that lost sinners have the command to repent and believe does not allow us to infer to their ability to believe and repent such that we set aside all the clear texts on moral inability with respect to faith.   

44 Cf. Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, 586-588 and The Canons of Dort, “Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine: The Corruption of man, His Conversion to God, and the Manner Thereof.” 

45 Our interpretations must be subject to examination by the church at large. Nonetheless, it should be easy for us to see (by the aid of the paradoxicality model) that there are scores of inability texts and “cannot” texts. It is reasonable to affirm that we must keep them front and center in our discussions with acute awareness of the philosophically problematic nature of the “duty implies ability” challenge to the “clear” message of the “cannot” texts.  

46 It is perhaps the result of the failure to preserve the distinctiveness of the “duty implies ability” principle to 

Christians who have the indwelling Spirit and can discern spiritual things. It is the natural man that can do nothing good whatever.

PART 16 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 9

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

4) Free will doctrine misses the full depth of evil28

 Do we overstate when we say that fallen sinners do nothing good whatever? No, because though people may do some “good” outwardly, the natural man fails to meet three conditions of a good act: the right standard (according to God’s law), the right motive (arising from love for God), and the right goal (aiming at the glory of God).29

 Hence, Jeremiah argues that fallen man can do something good if the Ethiopian can change his skin or the leopard his spots, but both are impossible, so he is not able to do anything good: Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? Then also you can do good who are accustomed to do evil (Jer.13:23; cf. Gen. 6.5, wickedness of… his heart was only evil continually).30

 This is paradoxical: he has full responsibility and complete moral inability.  

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes 

28 Free will doctrine yields a definition of sin by which fallen man is able to do some good but it is difficult to accept the idea that this good is acceptable in the eyes of God though it may be such in the eyes of man. Both good and evil actions of fallen man are (re)-defined in human terms before human eyes.  

29 Van Til finds the solution to the good act by asking and answering three questions: “(a) What is the motive of human action? (b) What is the standard of human action? (c) What is the end or purpose of human action? Christian Theistic Ethics (Philadelphia: den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1971), 3.  

30 We might say that a serial killer “loves” his mother, but even that love does not meet the three conditions of a good act, so it is not good in the eyes of God.  


PART 10 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 8

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

3) Free will doctrine supports only half of its definition 

 Fallen man does not have free will because he cannot do anything good. Free will teaching (fallen man can do good or evil) has the doing evil half of its definition in place but not the doing good half.  

 Since Scripture is so clear on the natural man’s moral inability (he cannot bring forth good actions, he cannot believe,19 he cannot understand the things of the Spirit; he cannot submit to the law of God, etc.20), we wonder about the source of the idea of free will. What is the biblical basis for tweaking the impact of the large number of clear inability texts in the interest of affirming belief in free will? As far as I can tell there is one line of support: the notion that “ought to” implies “able to”; as Geisler claims: the command to believe indicates the ability (freedom and free will) to believe.21 This belief is a starting point in Kant’s philosophy of religion and in the typical defenses of free will.22

 It is allegedly self-evident and intuitive. Hence, it easily takes on presuppositional status. However, there is the serious problem that this principle opens a flood gate for evil without responsibility because “if I am morally responsible then I am morally able” logically, by contraposition, implies “If I am not morally able, then I am not morally responsible.”23

 This logical entailment is highly suspect. The following examples show that the “ought/able” 

inference fails.   

 a) Sub prime slime example: If I am morally responsible to pay my mortgage (it is more than money; it is a moral obligation) then I must be morally able to pay it (I must be honest and work hard) and if not morally able to pay it then I am not morally responsible to pay it. This means that the person who lacks integrity (who cannot find it in himself to be honest, work hard, and sacrifice to meet his financial/moral obligations) is not accountable (to men or to God).24

 b) Hitler example: if Hitler was not able to love the Jews then he was not responsible to love them. He was so saturated with compounding sins that bound him in lust for power, hatred, and murder that he was therefore not responsible for what He did. Clearly, responsibility does not imply ability.  

 c) Worst are least example: if responsibility implies ability, then as a criminal becomes more hardened, he becomes less responsible.   

 d) Commandments example: is the non-Christian responsible to keep the Ten Commandments? Surely, we will say, “yes!” Is he able to comply with them25 in their true spirit and intent? Surely, we will say “he is not able.”26

 Therefore, responsibility does not imply ability and the philosophical basis for free will does not overturn the clear biblical teaching on fallen man’s moral inability.27

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

19 John 6.44 (“no one can come to me”: no one is able to believe); Romans 8.7 (he cannot submit [in faith] to God).

20 Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, 586-88. 

21 Geisler, Chosen but Free, 30. 

22 In Kant’s reading of Scripture, it is of the essence of man that the antecedent to every act is an expression of freedom; otherwise, “the use or abuse of man’s power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral,” Immanual Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt Hudson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1960). 16. Thus, the tablet of stone for much of modern philosophy and theology has these Kantian inscriptions: “If I am responsible, then I must be able” and “duty demands nothing of us that we can not do” (Religion 43). Interestingly, Kant’s argument for free will is the reductio: without it there is no such thing as morality. 

23 Another example of contraposition (that applies to sufficient conditional statements) pertains to faith and  salvation: “If you have faith then you have salvation” logically contraposes to “If you do not have salvation then you do not have faith.”  

24 On this principle, the inability to be honest and have a hearty work ethic that leads to mortgage default demands a moral social order in which foreclosures are unethical and bail outs are proper. On a larger scale, this opens a wide door to moral hazard: I can “irresponsibly” take bad risks because I will not be held accountable.  

25 Because of debate about the Law, we should note that this argument has the same weight if we substitute the commandments of Jesus for the Ten Commandments. Or, we might simply ask, “Are we responsible to be holy as God is holy?” Surely, we are responsible even though we are unable.  

26 If he worships false gods, lies, steals, and commits murder, he is accountable, even though he is not able to obey God’s precepts. Moreover, if he disobeys the gospel command to repent and believe, he is accountable, even though he is not able to repent and believe. In a word, fallen man does not have free will because he is evil; his nature is evil; his heart is evil. Because he is evil, we reasonably conclude, do we not, that he is all the more responsible? He is fully responsible; he has full responsibility and no “free will.” 

27 Cf. the substantive treatment of the three blocks of biblical material that support the bondage of the will in Historical Theology, by Cunningham, II, 586-88. By contrast, Wesley affirms and supports a full fledged doctrine of fallen man’s moral inability at the beginning of his Sermon on Free Grace by noting that free grace does “not depend on any power…in man; no, not in any degree…Whatsoever good is in man, or is done by man, God is the author and doer of it. Thus is his grace free in all; that is, no way depending on any power or merit in man, but on God alone” (par. 3.2, 8-9), even though he ends the sermon by stating that “all who suffer Christ to make them alive” (par. 29.4) “shall live” (29.3).


PART 9 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 7

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

2) Free will doctrine misrepresents human nature 

 Fallen man does not have free will because he cannot decide, choose, or act outside of his evil nature. Like a diseased tree, he cannot bear good fruit16 (Mat. 7.18) and the evil person out of his evil treasure brings forth evil (Mat. 12.35). Free will doctrine teaches that the evil person out of his evil heart brings forth some good (at least when he chooses to submit to God in faith), but this idea misrepresents the teaching of Jesus that character determines conduct. To make the point by inversion, consider that fact that a loving mother cannot intentionally harm her child; she cannot act outside of her character as a loving mother. Nor can unloving evil people bear good fruit.17 Also, note both strands of this paradox: 

a) moral inability is here: the evil heart cannot bear good fruit (Mat. 7.18) and the evil person (Mat. 12.34, you are evil) cannot speak good things (12.34, You brood of vipers! How can you speak good, when you are evil?). 

b) Full responsibility is here: on the day of judgment people will give account for every careless word they speak (Mat. 12.36).18

 Therefore, free will teaching misrepresents human nature by affirming that fallen man can act contrary to his evil nature. 

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes 

16 The Christian is a good tree and his inability to bring forth bad fruit is eschatological. For the non-Christian, the inability to do anything good is part and parcel of the present evil age.  

17 However, if character determines conduct, what then do we say about character determining choices such as the choice to study the Scriptures regularly to be shaped by them in submission to Christ for the glory of God? That character determining choice arises from Christian character already, from the renewal of the heart by the Holy Spirit that gives “newness of life” (Rom. 6.4). Otherwise, the natural man cannot submit to the law of God (Rom. 8.7). He must be set free from his slavery in order to be free for righteousness (Rom. 6.18).  

18 Jesus teaches that there is moral inability (because you are evil, you cannot speak good words) and the fact of full responsibility (you will give account for every careless word, which is a fortiori for absolutely every word). Before the Genesis flood, every inclination of man’s heart was only evil continually, Gen. 6.5. Being so gripped by their rebellion and sinfulness, they could not do anything good, but they were fully accountable as the judgment of the flood showed. That judgment is an anticipation of the final judgment. As an accountable and inexcusable lawbreaker (Rom. 1-3), the natural man cannot submit to God or His law (Rom. 8.7, For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God's law; indeed, it cannot). Noting that submission to God is a quality of faith’s submissive obedience, it is clear that the natural man cannot come to Christ in faith and coming to Christ is surely something good.  


PART 8 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 6

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

Six inter-related reasons support this claim.14 These things may come to us as personal assault.15 We want the mirror on the wall to speak, but not to tell the truth of our natural ugliness. Thus, we need to approach the following reasons cautiously knowing that it is difficult to be true to thine own self. There is some overlap.

 1) Free will doctrine fragments the person 

Fallen man does not have free will because Scripture does not speak of having a “free will” but of being a free person. But fallen man is not a free person; He is enslaved to sin and free from righteousness: When you were slaves of sin, you were free in regard to righteousness (Rom. 6.20). He, the person, not his will, must be set free for righteousness (Rom. 6.18). Thus, in Scripture, there is no such “thing” as a free will; there is only a free person who chooses and decides accordingly in contrast to an enslaved person who chooses and decides accordingly. 

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

14 For clarity I state them in a blunt way; the intent is not dogmatism but efficiency. My goal is irenic.  

15 We deceive ourselves with illusions and when the conscience is disquieted by God’s law, “it begins to fear that it might be living in illusion and untruth, that its values and calculations are unfounded, that it is moving in the wrong direction…this law [is] the great disrupting of the presupposed illusion of the “You ought and therefore you can”…a self-entrenching against God…In this illusion man himself is the subject who commands; he is autonomous …refusing to acknowledge God…God makes contact with man at the point where man digs in against him, at the nerve of man’s curving in upon himself. The contact is thus a new creation and a new birth…miracle (Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith: Prolegomena, the Relation of Theology to Modern Thought Forms [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974] 144-146.


PART 7 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 5

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

2A. Case in point 

  The focus here is not on the paradox of sovereignty and responsibility;11 it is on this assertion: “Fallen man does not have free will in his moral actions, but he does have full moral responsibility.” Here, free will means that fallen man has the ability to do good or evil.12  

Our case in point has two threads. They are in tension since it is difficult to grasp their inter-connection. It is easy to use one to deny the truth of the other. One could argue that if man is morally unable in his actions then he cannot be accountable for them. Moreover, it is easy to reason that if man is accountable (in light of Judgment Day), then he must have moral ability, i.e.  free will.13 Questioning belief in responsibility is hardly controversial, so our present task is to 

establish the claim that fallen man does not have free will.

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

11 See John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (P & R Publishing: Phillipsburg, NJ, 2001), pp. 119-141 for a discussion of free will in relation to foreordination.  

12 “God has give us genuine freedom to accept or reject the grace offered to all,” Bruce R. Reichenbach, “Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1999), 299 and “the power of moral choice entails the ability either to choose the good God designed for us or to reject it…the good thing called free will” is something man has in the fall, Norman Geisler, Chosen But Free: A Balanced View of Divine Election (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany House Publishes, 1999), 22-23, 29. David Basinger emphasizes the philosophical definition that free will is the ability to what you want without being forced in doing it: “God…must allow choice to be voluntary in the sense that it is free from coercive divine manipulation,” The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove, Ill: Inter-Varsity Press, 1996), 36. Notably, Calvin states that those who are not graciously illumined by the Spirit are people who “voluntarily disbelieve,” Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, trans. J. K. S. Reid (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 58. 

13 In his infamous book on the philosophy of religion (“Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone”), Immanual Kant gave philosophy and theology a definition of free will that has the status of a commandment indelibly codified for all time on tablets of stone. His definition is intuitively simple and profoundly toxic. On one hand, if I am responsible for my actions, then I must be able to choose to do what is right or to do what is wrong. On the other hand, for Kant (and in many subtle ways for his disciples), belief in autonomous free will is an ultimate controlling belief (a presupposition) in his interpretation of Scripture and Christianity. For example, according to Kant’s reading of Scripture, it is of the essence of man that the antecedent to every act is an expression of freedom; otherwise, “the use or abuse of man’s power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral” (p. 16). Thus, the tablet of stone for much of modern philosophy and theology has these inscriptions: “If I am responsible, then I must be able” and “duty demands nothing of us that we can not do” (p. 43). His ultimate controlling belief leads Kant to some extraordinarily toxic views: restoration from the fall by selfconversion, the Son of God as a personification of the perfect humanity located in each person and justification by faith in the good that one finds within and freely chooses to incorporate as a maxim or rule of life (pp. 40-48). A contemporary example of this same toxicity is the open-theist use of free will as the controlling belief that leads ultimately to a redefinition of the biblical teaching about God (as Frame shows in No Other God, pp. 119-122).


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