Reflections on "The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model"

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. The entire series can be viewed as separate "bite sized" posts here or you may wish to read it in long form here. Following are my reflections on the material.

Reading through Dr. Ostella's paper on theological paradox was highly beneficial for me. I appreciate the fact that he begins with a careful definition of theological paradox. Helpfully, he mentions this about identifying paradoxes: 

Paradoxicality is not difficulty in arriving at comparable truths, but difficulty in harmonizing truths that are clear.

Thus, it is not a question of perspicuity (the clarity of Scripture), but of logically reconciling that which is perspicuous. Dr. Ostella shows that his embrace of theological paradox is not in any way a rejection of the use of logic, but exactly the opposite: a full acceptance of it.

Therefore, to fulfill our role on earth receiving God's communication to us in nature and in Christ, we ought to be logical, consistent, and non-contradictory in our thinking . . . Using logic is an “ought to”; it is an ethical ought. Being logical is being godly. It is God-like. It is good and proper. It is required of us not only academically or intellectually but also morally and spiritually. 

Also:

The coherence of God and His revelation calls us to avoid contradictory thoughts and practices. . . . God is logical because He is truth. If there were contradictions in God's knowledge, then some of His knowledge would be false, He would not be the truth, and He would not be God. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in God’s revelation; therefore, man, His image bearer, to be like Him, must avoid contradiction.  Nonetheless, we must come to terms with apparent contradictions, beliefs that seem inconsistent. Importantly, we know that there is no inconsistency between them because God has revealed them. 

At the same time,

Paradoxicality should be no surprise. After all, we are creatures and He is the Creator. We have limited knowledge; we cannot penetrate all the interconnections that exist within the truth that God knows.

Ostella does not merely affirm the validity of logic; he makes proficient use of it. His identification of the Kantian formula, "Duty implies ability," as unbiblical and illogical is particularly helpful. His exegetical analysis of numerous Biblical texts in refutation of this commonly held assumption is also excellent. I found the following line of reasoning deeply insightful:

For Christians who can live righteously but who may also sin, is their ability to sin central to their new found freedom in Christ? No, it shows that they have freedom now partially and not yet fully. Their ability to sin is not evidence that they are free. Instead, it is evidence that their freedom is incomplete. What demonstrates their freedom? What shows that they are free persons is their ability to do good from the heart, even though it has to grow.

Along the way, Ostella effectively uses various illustrations to demonstrate his points. Alongside of these are extensive quotations from other scholars, including some wonderful excerpts from John Calvin.


Finally, Dr. Ostella's systematic and ferocious (yet irenic) dismantling of "free will" doctrine - from the "duty implies ability" fallacy to the Arminian notion of "prevenient grace" - is simply incredible!


I am deeply grateful to Dr. Ostella for allowing me to share his superb article with readers of THEOparadox. As a result of studying this material, I have gained a better understanding of leading Reformed thinkers like John Calvin, Cornelius Van Til, John Frame and Scott Oliphint, as well as some of their detractors. Most importantly, I have gained useful insight into the Bible itself.

Questions for reflection

1. How might someone attempt to overthrow the arguments presented in the paper? Are there any obvious openings?
2. Which part of Dr. Ostella's article was most edifying or beneficial to you?

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 10

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

5) Free will perspective blurs saving grace  

 This doctrine results in diplopia (dual vision) regarding saving grace in which there exists 

semi-free/semi-enslaved sinners in a state between slavery to sin and freedom for righteousness. 

Claim: before the regeneration and freeing of a dead slave to sin takes place, there is a 

regeneration-like enabling of the dead to respond to the gospel, a granting of freedom to the 

natural man while he remains in his fallen state.31 This is soteriological diplopia at best (and 

contradiction at worst). At the place where Scripture presents a single setting free which involves 

newness of life by a new creation, free will doctrine sees double: a giving of ability prior to 

regeneration and a giving of ability by means of regeneration. 

 Problem: all the passages that deal with opening blind eyes, unstopping deaf ears, giving 

life to the dead, setting the slave to sin free, making a new creation refer to regeneration, the 

actual bringing of a sinner into fellowship with God (1 Cor 1.7).32

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

31 This enlivening-freeing-enabling is not regeneration; it does not save. Instead, it gives man the ability in his fallen and natural state to either obey the gospel or disobey it. In other words, this pre-regeneration-regeneration-like action of God bestows free will. Thus, although fallen man has this ability to hear God’s call, to see the truth, and to respond to it, having this ability (this life, this freedom) is not regeneration but a working of grace that makes a significant change in the dead sinner freeing him sufficiently and making him alive enough to take the next step and allow God to make him alive by the new birth. This is Wesley’s way of holding to a strong view of man’s depravity (Sermon on Free Grace, par. 3 ) and compromising it at the same time because for him dead and enslaved sinners who are unable to respond to the gospel nonetheless “suffer” [allow] God to make them alive (Sermon on Free Grace, par. 29). For a helpful explanation and critical evaluation of the Wesleyan view of prevenient see “Does Scripture Teach Prevenient Grace in the Wesleyan Sense?” by Thomas R. Schreiner, The Grace of God and the Bondage of the Will (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995), II, 365-382. 

32 There are no passages that explicitly apply any kind of enabling, enlivening, eye-opening, or setting free in some way that is prior to and less than regeneration. Free will perspective views these things with blurred vision and sees double. On this view, there is some kind setting free of sinners within their bondage so they can choose to go free or remain in bondage: they are set free within bondage and given the ability to choose freedom, if they choose freedom, they are then set free from bondage. Evidence from Scripture for the presence of free will in pre-regenerate sinners boils down to two key texts: Jn. 1.9 (The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world) and 12.32 (And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself). However, John 1.9 can be reasonably taken to refer to the non-saving light of natural revelation that renders all men responsible on a par with Rom. 1.1-18. In John 12.32, the drawing of all to Christ says nothing of a pre-regeneration semi-saving grace of enablement, but reasonably refers to the drawing of people from all nations to actual salvation by the power of the cross. Thus, in paraphrase, Jesus says, “by the cross, I will draw people of all nations savingly to myself.” It is clear, then on the questionable use of John 12.32, that the cross only secured pre-regeneration and not regeneration (the dead in sin are given sufficient life to respond to the gospel); the cross did not secure redemptive release from sin or an eternal release contrary to Hebrews 9.12, which teaches that the cross secured eternal redemption. Ultimately, the teaching rests on the Kantian philosophical notion that “duty implies ability.” For Thielicke, this notion is the natural man’s illusion that is overcome when the Holy Spirit gives a new self-understanding by death to the old Cartesian self, Evangelical Faith, 138-173

PART 11 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 8

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

3) Free will doctrine supports only half of its definition 

 Fallen man does not have free will because he cannot do anything good. Free will teaching (fallen man can do good or evil) has the doing evil half of its definition in place but not the doing good half.  

 Since Scripture is so clear on the natural man’s moral inability (he cannot bring forth good actions, he cannot believe,19 he cannot understand the things of the Spirit; he cannot submit to the law of God, etc.20), we wonder about the source of the idea of free will. What is the biblical basis for tweaking the impact of the large number of clear inability texts in the interest of affirming belief in free will? As far as I can tell there is one line of support: the notion that “ought to” implies “able to”; as Geisler claims: the command to believe indicates the ability (freedom and free will) to believe.21 This belief is a starting point in Kant’s philosophy of religion and in the typical defenses of free will.22

 It is allegedly self-evident and intuitive. Hence, it easily takes on presuppositional status. However, there is the serious problem that this principle opens a flood gate for evil without responsibility because “if I am morally responsible then I am morally able” logically, by contraposition, implies “If I am not morally able, then I am not morally responsible.”23

 This logical entailment is highly suspect. The following examples show that the “ought/able” 

inference fails.   

 a) Sub prime slime example: If I am morally responsible to pay my mortgage (it is more than money; it is a moral obligation) then I must be morally able to pay it (I must be honest and work hard) and if not morally able to pay it then I am not morally responsible to pay it. This means that the person who lacks integrity (who cannot find it in himself to be honest, work hard, and sacrifice to meet his financial/moral obligations) is not accountable (to men or to God).24

 b) Hitler example: if Hitler was not able to love the Jews then he was not responsible to love them. He was so saturated with compounding sins that bound him in lust for power, hatred, and murder that he was therefore not responsible for what He did. Clearly, responsibility does not imply ability.  

 c) Worst are least example: if responsibility implies ability, then as a criminal becomes more hardened, he becomes less responsible.   

 d) Commandments example: is the non-Christian responsible to keep the Ten Commandments? Surely, we will say, “yes!” Is he able to comply with them25 in their true spirit and intent? Surely, we will say “he is not able.”26

 Therefore, responsibility does not imply ability and the philosophical basis for free will does not overturn the clear biblical teaching on fallen man’s moral inability.27

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

19 John 6.44 (“no one can come to me”: no one is able to believe); Romans 8.7 (he cannot submit [in faith] to God).

20 Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, 586-88. 

21 Geisler, Chosen but Free, 30. 

22 In Kant’s reading of Scripture, it is of the essence of man that the antecedent to every act is an expression of freedom; otherwise, “the use or abuse of man’s power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral,” Immanual Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt Hudson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1960). 16. Thus, the tablet of stone for much of modern philosophy and theology has these Kantian inscriptions: “If I am responsible, then I must be able” and “duty demands nothing of us that we can not do” (Religion 43). Interestingly, Kant’s argument for free will is the reductio: without it there is no such thing as morality. 

23 Another example of contraposition (that applies to sufficient conditional statements) pertains to faith and  salvation: “If you have faith then you have salvation” logically contraposes to “If you do not have salvation then you do not have faith.”  

24 On this principle, the inability to be honest and have a hearty work ethic that leads to mortgage default demands a moral social order in which foreclosures are unethical and bail outs are proper. On a larger scale, this opens a wide door to moral hazard: I can “irresponsibly” take bad risks because I will not be held accountable.  

25 Because of debate about the Law, we should note that this argument has the same weight if we substitute the commandments of Jesus for the Ten Commandments. Or, we might simply ask, “Are we responsible to be holy as God is holy?” Surely, we are responsible even though we are unable.  

26 If he worships false gods, lies, steals, and commits murder, he is accountable, even though he is not able to obey God’s precepts. Moreover, if he disobeys the gospel command to repent and believe, he is accountable, even though he is not able to repent and believe. In a word, fallen man does not have free will because he is evil; his nature is evil; his heart is evil. Because he is evil, we reasonably conclude, do we not, that he is all the more responsible? He is fully responsible; he has full responsibility and no “free will.” 

27 Cf. the substantive treatment of the three blocks of biblical material that support the bondage of the will in Historical Theology, by Cunningham, II, 586-88. By contrast, Wesley affirms and supports a full fledged doctrine of fallen man’s moral inability at the beginning of his Sermon on Free Grace by noting that free grace does “not depend on any power…in man; no, not in any degree…Whatsoever good is in man, or is done by man, God is the author and doer of it. Thus is his grace free in all; that is, no way depending on any power or merit in man, but on God alone” (par. 3.2, 8-9), even though he ends the sermon by stating that “all who suffer Christ to make them alive” (par. 29.4) “shall live” (29.3).


PART 9 - Click Here

The Legitimacy of Paradox as a Theological Model - Part 5

Pastor Richard Ostella of Westminster Reformed Church in Plymouth, Michigan has graciously granted permission to re-publish his March 2009 ETS paper on theological paradox here at THEOparadox. To understand these thoughts in context, please begin with part 1.

2A. Case in point 

  The focus here is not on the paradox of sovereignty and responsibility;11 it is on this assertion: “Fallen man does not have free will in his moral actions, but he does have full moral responsibility.” Here, free will means that fallen man has the ability to do good or evil.12  

Our case in point has two threads. They are in tension since it is difficult to grasp their inter-connection. It is easy to use one to deny the truth of the other. One could argue that if man is morally unable in his actions then he cannot be accountable for them. Moreover, it is easy to reason that if man is accountable (in light of Judgment Day), then he must have moral ability, i.e.  free will.13 Questioning belief in responsibility is hardly controversial, so our present task is to 

establish the claim that fallen man does not have free will.

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Pastor Ostella's Footnotes

11 See John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (P & R Publishing: Phillipsburg, NJ, 2001), pp. 119-141 for a discussion of free will in relation to foreordination.  

12 “God has give us genuine freedom to accept or reject the grace offered to all,” Bruce R. Reichenbach, “Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1999), 299 and “the power of moral choice entails the ability either to choose the good God designed for us or to reject it…the good thing called free will” is something man has in the fall, Norman Geisler, Chosen But Free: A Balanced View of Divine Election (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany House Publishes, 1999), 22-23, 29. David Basinger emphasizes the philosophical definition that free will is the ability to what you want without being forced in doing it: “God…must allow choice to be voluntary in the sense that it is free from coercive divine manipulation,” The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove, Ill: Inter-Varsity Press, 1996), 36. Notably, Calvin states that those who are not graciously illumined by the Spirit are people who “voluntarily disbelieve,” Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, trans. J. K. S. Reid (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 58. 

13 In his infamous book on the philosophy of religion (“Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone”), Immanual Kant gave philosophy and theology a definition of free will that has the status of a commandment indelibly codified for all time on tablets of stone. His definition is intuitively simple and profoundly toxic. On one hand, if I am responsible for my actions, then I must be able to choose to do what is right or to do what is wrong. On the other hand, for Kant (and in many subtle ways for his disciples), belief in autonomous free will is an ultimate controlling belief (a presupposition) in his interpretation of Scripture and Christianity. For example, according to Kant’s reading of Scripture, it is of the essence of man that the antecedent to every act is an expression of freedom; otherwise, “the use or abuse of man’s power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral” (p. 16). Thus, the tablet of stone for much of modern philosophy and theology has these inscriptions: “If I am responsible, then I must be able” and “duty demands nothing of us that we can not do” (p. 43). His ultimate controlling belief leads Kant to some extraordinarily toxic views: restoration from the fall by selfconversion, the Son of God as a personification of the perfect humanity located in each person and justification by faith in the good that one finds within and freely chooses to incorporate as a maxim or rule of life (pp. 40-48). A contemporary example of this same toxicity is the open-theist use of free will as the controlling belief that leads ultimately to a redefinition of the biblical teaching about God (as Frame shows in No Other God, pp. 119-122).


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