Answering Leighton Flowers on Libertarian Freedom and Compatibilism

In his podcasts, stalwart anti-Calvinist Leighton Flowers is fond of defining "Libertarian Free Will" (LFW) as "the ability to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

In at least one of his blog posts, he has defined the term a little further, as follows:

LFW = "The categorical ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action." 

(See here: https://soteriology101.wordpress.com/2017/07/01/sinaholics-a-debate-over-inability/)

First, let's define the added term, "categorical." According to the Oxford Dictionary, this word means "unambiguously explicit and direct." (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/categorical)

So, updating Dr. Flowers' working definition with this meaning, we have:

LFW = "The unambiguously explicit and direct ability of the will to refrain or not refrain from a given moral action."

No real significance is added with the inclusion of "categorical;" it simply renders the statement slightly more emphatic. As far as the addition of "the will" to this working definition, this also does not seem to add anything of substance. By definition, choosing and deciding are activities in which the will is active. Whether we phrase this as "refrain or not refrain from," or, as I would prefer, "engage or not engage in," a given moral action--this is nothing more than a description of the will's basic function. A person without a will could do nothing of a moral nature.

This definition of LFW summarizes the position Dr. Flowers affirms in opposition to what he thinks Calvinists believe. Nevertheless, I wonder how many well-informed Calvinists would actually dispute the fact that this ability exists?

As a Calvinist and theological compatibilist, I really have no problem accepting Dr. Flowers' definition as a valid description of "will" (or even "free will") and affirming that human beings possess it. Every rational person should find this to be intuitive and self-evident. Of course human beings have this ability. At the same time, my compatibilism affirms that all of the "free choices" of human beings are foreknown and foreordained by a wise and good God. One might ask, "How can this be?" 

From the perspective of compatibilism, we can line up the propositions this way:

P1 Human beings possess the ability to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P2 God has ordained which moral actions each human being will choose to refrain from, and which moral actions each human being will choose not to refrain from.

P3 Human beings exercise their "free will" in choosing to refrain or not refrain from given moral actions.

P4 God exercises His sovereignty in determining how, when, where, and why man's "free will" shall be exercised. 

These are the rudimentary claims of theological compatibilism, which in itself is a very simple concept. From this standpoint, I would affirm Dr. Flowers' definition of LFW within my own understanding of compatibilism, and would find no contradiction. In what it affirms, his claim is true and just needs more added to it. His definition adequately describes man's part; however, God's part is neglected.

Of course, much more rigorous philosophical definitions of LFW have been put forth, and they typically entail a denial of the possibility that specified moral actions are pre-determined in any way. We should oppose that type of LFW as an outright denial of Biblical truth. At least at the level of defining terms, Leighton Flowers does not seem to hold to that type of LFW. And that is commendable, for it leaves the door open to a Biblical compatibilism.

On the other hand, if Dr. Flowers were to put forth a definition like the following, we would have to reject it:

LFW = "the willingness of the will to choose what is good (as God defines it), apart from grace."

What is the difference? If we are only talking about "ability," that is one thing. God gives all of us abilities that we do not exercise. I always have the "ability" to steal food from the grocery store; however, by the grace of God I have so far never had the "will" to do it. I also have the "ability" to purchase and smoke cigarettes. And, fortunately, I have never had the "will" to do that, either. I also have the ability to purchase food and give it to homeless people. By God's grace that has actually happened once or twice. The operative phrase here is "by God's grace."

Sadly, there are also morally reprehensible actions I have had the will to do from time to time, and I did not refrain from doing them. And it is just the same with you, my friend. We are all sinners who have had our wills set in opposition to God and have done a variety of evil things. I thank God that by His mercy I have not done even more evil. If not for His mercy, I surely would have. That I recognize my evils as evil, and that He gives me the willingness to repent and pursue the good, is an incredible mercy. But this is not from any purportedly natural "free will," it is from grace alone!

As a compatibilist, I affirm that my every inclination toward good is graciously given from God. Such willingness would not have sprung up out of my own heart, if grace had not been given to direct me toward the good and the right. If not for grace, I certainly would have refrained from every good act and would have only pursued evil.

As a compatibilist, I affirm that every inclination I have toward evil comes solely from me. I own it and I am fully responsible for it, even if God also foreordained which actions I will choose. His foreordination does not change the fact that it is my own will and I am responsible. I was the one who chose to refrain or not refrain. It wasn't as if I tried to do good and He instead directed me toward evil, saying "I would rather you do this evil thing." And it is not as though He made me do it, in any sense. Foreordination is not that. God forbid that such an unworthy thought should ever be embraced.

Ever since the fall, man's will and very nature have been bent toward evil, and this can only change through God's grace. By nature, apart from grace, fallen man, having the ability to choose between good and evil, will always choose evil. The problem is not rooted in "ability;" it is rooted in "will." Fallen man is "totally unable" to do good only because he is "totally unwilling." Thankfully, common grace results in a measure of good that is accomplished even through the unregenerate. Saving grace results in the introduction of a new, regenerated nature within the believer. A nature that truly longs for what is good. And so, by God's grace, there is much good in the world. We should glorify Him perpetually and magnificently for this!

A Biblical perspective would never credit the choice for good to our own mere ability or willingness (this would be self-deception and vainglory); nor would it ever blame God for our own choices of evil (that would be blasphemous and ignorant).

Biblical thinking can only give God all the glory for all of the good that occurs. And we can only accept full responsibility for our own choices and actions. With this perspective, the believer is driven to keep repenting of his own evil and to continually ask God for more grace so that he can grow and do more good to the glory of God.

As Paul states:

I Cor. 15:10  But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God that is with me.

With Dr. Flowers' perspective, one wonders how the believer may ever know that he is experiencing grace, since it all seems to boil down to the exercise of one's own natural ability to "refrain or not refrain" from this or that moral action. When does a person come face to face with the realities of his own corrupt will, and how sharply that will is bent toward evil? Or with the need for God to rescue us from that will, lest we perish? 

If my salvation or sanctification depended on my own ability and willingness to "refrain" from what is evil and "not refrain" from what is good, I suspect that there would be no hope at all for me. 

Romans 7:24-25a  Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!

May those who downplay the need for grace in these matters find themselves desperately longing for the only Redeemer who can rescue us from the results of our own ability and will.

PARADOX FILES, Vol. 11 - Louis Berkhof

Louis Berkhof posthumously wins one of our famous t-shirts for the THEOparadoxical thinking exhibited in his defense of the doctrine of common grace. Berkhof sees God's Being as infinite and supra-logical, and therefore capable of more deeply complex intentions than many would typically ascribe to Him.

Although some will argue that the Scriptures make no distinction between "common" and "special" grace, these designations are nothing more than a helpful way of describing God's mercy toward all mankind, in contrast with His sovereign election of some (both of which are clearly taught in the Scriptures). We can think of "common grace" as that kindness which God extends to all people everywhere - even those who never believe. All sinners who continue to live on earth receive air, water, food, sunshine and a host of other little enjoyments each day. If God's kindness and love were restricted to the elect alone, the reprobate could not be held guilty for failing to give thanks to God for His Providential bounty. But as it stands, all men are guilty of aggravated sin by exalting God's good gifts above God Himself, and loving the effects of divine love rather than the Cause Himself. Unregenerate men take these gifts as deserved quantities, while the righteous feel ever so unworthy to receive them, seeing their own natural sinfulness clearly. The saints wonder how it can be that God should so favor them as to provide even one more breath - let alone fellowship with Christ and eternal life in the joy of their Lord.

In Arminianism, common and special grace are both denied. Such distinctions are unnecessary if there is no sovereign election. Arminians posit a universal "prevenient grace," which essentially means that God gives every person an equal opportunity to make a free will choice for or against Christ. In this way, they preserve the foundation of salvation as grounded in divine grace and initiated by God, while denying that God is ultimately decisive in the matter. Prevenient grace simply makes it possible for man to choose what he wants, and it portrays God as "offering" salvation in the hope that some will respond without His special intervention. While this ascribes a certain attractive sense of humanistic "fairness" to God, it has the negative side effect of placing man's will above that of the Creator. It also gives me the right to boast against non-believers, since I wisely responded to the prevenient grace and they did not. Calvinists note that God is neither required nor obligated to save any sinner, that He would remain just if He never offered any opportunities for salvation, and therefore He has the right to sovereignly intervene where and as He chooses. Yet the Calvinist does not leave the non-elect beyond the glow of God's mercy, which is over all His works and abounds too much to be escaped entirely - even by those who are fleeing from Him.

Interestingly, the denial of common grace is a defining mark of hyper-Calvinism. Hyper-Calvinists emphasize God's hatred of the non-elect, and deny any sense of God's love or grace toward the reprobate. These matters must be sorted out with Scriptural reasoning, and with a healthy sense of paradox in view, for the same God who "hated" Esau also allowed him a place to live in safety, command over an army of 400 men, and resources he himself described as "plenty." (Gen. 33:9). Did Esau deserve these things? No? Then they were certainly given as gifts of grace - undeserved! How can these things be? Without further adieu, let's hear Mr. Berkhof's defense of the more moderate, Biblically balanced perspective which is set forth in classical Calvinism . . .

"Another objection to the doctrine of common grace is that it presupposes a certain favorable disposition in God even to reprobate sinners, while we have no right to assume such a disposition in God. This stricture takes its starting point in the eternal counsel of God, in His election and reprobation. Along the line of His election God reveals His love, grace, mercy, and long-suffering, leading to salvation; and in the historical realization of his reprobation He gives expression only to His aversion, disfavor, hatred, and wrath, leading to destruction. But this looks like a rationalistic over-simplification of the inner life of God, which does not take sufficient account of His self-revelation. In speaking on this subject we ought to be very careful and allow ourselves to be guided by the explicit statements of Scripture rather than by our bold inferences from the secret counsel of God. There is far more in God than we can reduce to our logical categories. Are the elect in this life the objects of God’s’ love only, and never in any sense the objects of His wrath? Is Moses thinking of the reprobate when he says: “For we are consumed in thine anger, and in thy wrath are we troubled”? Ps. 90:7. Does not the statement of Jesus that the wrath of God abides on them that obey not the Son imply that it is removed from the others when, and not until, they submit to the beneficent rule of Christ? John 3:36. And does not Paul say to the Ephesians that they “were by nature children of wrath even as the rest”? Eph. 2:3 . Evidently the elect can not be regarded as always and exclusively the objects of God’s love. And if they who are the objects of God’s redeeming love can also in some sense of the word be regarded as the objects of His wrath, why should it be impossible that they who are the objects of His wrath should also in some sense share His divine favor? A father who is also a judge may loathe the son that is brought before him as a criminal, and feel constrained to visit his judicial wrath upon him, but may yet pity him and show him acts of kindness while he is under condemnation. Why should this be impossible in God? General Washington hated the traitor that was brought before him and condemned him to death, but at the same time showed him compassion by serving him with the dainties from his own table. Cannot God have compassion even on the condemned sinner, and bestow favors upon him? The answer need not be uncertain, since the Bible clearly teaches that He showers untold blessings upon all men and also clearly indicates that these are the expression of a favorable disposition in God, which falls short, however, of the positive volition to pardon their sin, to lift their sentence, and to grant them salvation. The following passages clearly point to such a favorable disposition: Prov. 1:24; Isa. 1:18; Ezek. 18:23,32; 33:11 ; Matt. 5:43-45; 23:37; Mark 10:21 ; Luke 6:35: Rom. 2:4; I Tim. 2:4. If such passages do not testify to a favorable disposition in God, it would seem that language has lost its meaning, and that God’s’ revelation is not dependable on this subject."

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1960), 445-446.

HT: CalvinAndCalvinism.com